The Limited Impact of \u3ci\u3eLucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council\u3c/i\u3e on Massachusetts Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence by Cerundolo, Pat A
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 2 Article 4
12-1-1998
The Limited Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council on Massachusetts Regulatory
Takings Jurisprudence
Pat A. Cerundolo
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pat A. Cerundolo, The Limited Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Massachusetts Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 25
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 431 (1998),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol25/iss2/4
THE LIMITED IMPACT OF LUCAS V. SOUTH 
CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL ON MASSACHUSETTS 
REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
Pat A. Cerundolo* 
The United States Supreme Court has a long history of reviewing 
landowners' allegations that restrictive land use regulations amount 
to uncompensated takings of their property in violation of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.1 Many of these "regulatory takings" 
decisions hinged on the Court's willingness to allow states to control 
land use without the fear of compensation or invalidation, while others 
focused on due process concerns in cases where landowners alleged 
severely diminished property values.2 This long line of Supreme Court 
takings decisions, however, had not resulted in any categorical takings 
rules other than general pronouncements and balancing tests.3 
Rather, the Court preferred to make ad hoc, factual inquiries that 
often balanced private property rights against state regulatory pow-
ers that, for the most part; were bolstered by the Court's deference 
to the states' police power.4 
Many hoped that the 1992 case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council would finally settle this uncertain takings jurisprudence.5 
* Topics Editor, Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW, 1997-1998. 
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which 
guarantees that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation, is 
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago B. & Q.R. CO. 
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). 
2 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); see also Hadacheck v. Se-
bastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176 (1887); Mugler v. 
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887); Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1571 (Fed. 
Cir.1994). 
3 See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
4 See id. 
6 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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Takings advocates expected Lucas to clarify some long-standing am-
biguities in the Supreme Court's takings law in the context of a 
growing sensitivity on the part of localities to environmental preser-
vation.6 Instead, however, many agree that Lucas has simply recast 
and not reformed the takings issue.7 In so doing, Lucas may have 
raised more questions than it has answered for state courts and 
regulators. 
Lucas was unprecedented in pronouncing as a "categorical rule" 
that a regulatory taking will occur when a challenged land use regu-
lation that is not otherwise grounded in background principles of 
nuisance law denies a landowner all "economically viable use of his 
land."s Some state practitioners expected this rule to have a notice-
able impact on state takings litigation.9 Indeed, the Lucas dissent 
feared the decision's possible chilling effect on legislators and land use 
planners due to its highly interventionist tone.IO Such fears, according 
to the dissent, were only compounded by the fact that environmental 
regulators often face the need to insulate limited state coffers from 
takings liability while shouldering the immense responsibility of pre-
serving local ecologies.ll 
Massachusetts courts have decided a long line of regulatory takings 
cases since the mid-1800s.I2 The development of this takings law 
through Lopes v. City of Peabody, one of the first state cases inter-
preting Lucas, presents an interesting case study of the impact of 
Lucas and its precedent on state takings jurisprudence.13 This Com-
ment will demonstrate that the Lucas decision should have no sig-
6 See Douglas R. Porter, The Lucas Case, in REGULATORY TAKINGS (93-19.07) 157 (1992). 
7 See Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1178-79 ("[When the Supreme Court took the Lucas case], it was 
understood to confront the Court with a much-heralded opportunity to clarify how courts were 
to balance public interest claims against liberty claims of private property owners, and to do it 
in a case in which the issue was sharply focused on fundamental ecological and environmental 
values. Instead, the court recast the issue."); Richard C. Ausness, Regulatory Takings and 
Wetland Protection in the Post-Lucas Era, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 365, 413-14 (1995). 
8 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1063 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
9 See Patricia A. Cantor, Where Are Courts Going with Regulatory Takings?, 23 M.L.W. 2350 
(July 31,1995); James R. Milkey, Office o/the Attorney General's Statement to Massachusetts 
Agencies on Recent Takings Cases, in REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 6, at 21. 
10 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1068-69, 1070 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Philip B. Herr, 
Planning Amid the Shifting Sands, in REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 6, at 143. 
11 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1069-70 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
12 See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53 (1851); Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. 55 
(1846). 
13 See Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312 (Mass. 1994); see also Ausness, supra note 
7, at 390. 
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nificant impact on Massachusetts law. First, a line of Massachusetts 
takings cases, in a prophetic foreshadowing of Lucas, in many ways 
followed what is now commonly termed the Lucas categorical takings 
rule.14 Secondly, the Massachusetts courts are not unfamiliar with 
applying a Lucas-type nuisance exception to takings claims.15 More-
over, an examination of Massachusetts case law leading up to Lopes 
can in fact answer some questions for Massachusetts that Lucas de-
liberately did not address, such as the breadth of the nuisance excep-
tion and a more substantive meaning of the deprivation of all practical 
use of land.16 
In Section I, this Comment examines the important Supreme Court 
cases leading up to the Lucas decision. Section II examines the Lucas 
case itself and dissenting opinions. Section III analyzes Massachu-
setts takings case law and the Massachusetts courts' interpretation 
of Supreme Court takings principles. Section IV demonstrates how 
Massachusetts case law may provide answers to some of Lucas' open 
questions, and moreover how Lucas' pronouncements should have a 
limited impact on future Massachusetts regulatory takings jurispru-
dence. 
1. SUPREME COURT TAKINGS HISTORY: THE MUDDY ROAD TO 
LUCAS 
Mugler v. Kansas was one of the earliest United States Supreme 
Court cases to address a land use regulation challenge based on the 
resulting economic injury to the landowner.17 In Mugler, the Court 
reviewed the economic impact on a local brewer of a Kansas stat-
ute outlawing the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors.18 The 
brewer alleged that the statute conflicted with the Due Process 
14 See MacNeil v. Town of Avon, 435 N.E.2d 1043, 1045 (Mass. 1982); Commissioner of Natural 
Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 206 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Mass. 1965); see also Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. 
v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 526 N.E.2d 1246, 1251 (Mass. 1988) (Lynch, J., dissenting); 
MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 340 N.E.2d 487, 490 (Mass. 1976). 
15 See Nassr v. Commonwealth, 477 N.E.2d 987, 990 (Mass. 1985); Lummis v. Lilly, 429 N.E.2d 
1146, 1150 (Mass. 1982); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 86, 90 (1851); Commonwealth v. 
Tewksbury, 52 Mass. 55, 55 (1846). 
16 See Yankee, 526 N.E.2d at 1250 n.8; MacGibbon, 340 N.E.2d at 491; Turnpike Realty Co. v. 
Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 899-900 (Mass. 1972). 
17 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
18 See id. at 657. The Kansas statute declared all places where intoxicating liquors were 
manufactured or sold as "common nuisance[s]." [d. at 655. 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the value of his brew-
ery was "very materially diminished" by its enforcement.19 
In refusing to find that the statute's enforcement amounted to a 
taking of the brewer's property, Justice Harlan posited that the police 
power should not be restrained by the Fourteenth Amendment's 
requirement of due process.20 Rather, he believed that a state's regu-
latory authority under the police power should extend beyond the 
mere suppression of nuisances, and is bounded only by a regulation's 
substantial relation to the public morals, health, and safety.21 The 
police power, Justice Harlan held, should not be ''burdened with the 
condition that the State must compensate ... individual owners for 
pecuniary losses they may sustain."22 Then, by distinguishing a state's 
decision to regulate noxious uses of property from those instances 
where states physically appropriate property for the public benefit, 
Justice Harlan refused to consider the statute's enforcement an exer-
cise of eminent domain.23 The Mugler rule, therefore, not only stipu-
lated that states can legitimately regulate beyond the abatement of 
per se nuisances, but also suggested that no legitimate exercise of the 
19 See id. at 657. The Court explicitly recognized that the buildings and machinery constituting 
Mugler's breweries were of little value if not used for the purposes of manufacturing beer, and 
that the statute, if enforced against Mugler, would "materially diminish[]" the value of his 
property. See id. at 657. The brewer did not dispute that Kansas possessed the police power 
authority to legislate against the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, but rather 
contested the uncompensated enforcement of the statute against owners of property whose 
value derived mainly from the liquor business. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 664. 
20 See id. at 663 (holding that "neither the [Fourteenth] amendment-broad and comprehen-
sive as it is-nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with the power of the state, 
sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, 
morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries 
of the state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity") (quoting Barbier v. 
Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885». Justice Harlan feared that such an interpretation might lead 
to the prejudice of the "public health" and the ''public morals," as "all property in this country 
is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the 
community." See id. at 665. 
21 See id. at 663; Bee alBo Catherine R. Connors, Back to the Future: The "Nuisance Exception" 
to the Compensation Clause, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 139, 161 (1990). 
22 See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669. Justice Harlan considered this to be the case especially when 
a statute prohibited the noxious uses of property that are injurious to the community. See id. 
28 See id. at ~9. Justice Harlan posited that states should not be burdened by a duty to 
compensate landowners for resisting noxious uses of property: ''The exercise of the police power 
by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisa."lce, or the prohibition of its use in 
a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very different from taking property 
for public use, or from depriving a person of his property without due process of law." [d. at 
669. 
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police power can result in a compensable taking, even in cases of the 
destruction of property values.24 
The Mugler rule prevailed in Supreme Court takings jurisprudence 
for over the next forty years. Numerous takings challenges involving 
regulations that purportedly controlled non-nuisance activities were 
thwarted based on Muglers broad police power notions.25 In each of 
these cases, the Court went so far as to propose that although regu-
lated activities were not actually nuisances per se, they were never-
theless nuisances "in fact and law."26 As such, they were properly 
regulated under the police power, regardless of the economic impact 
to property owners.27 Under Mugler and its progeny, the Court often 
denied that compensation was guaranteed by constitutional due proc-
ess considerations, even when regulations virtually eliminated the 
value of private property: "[W]here the public interest is involved[,] 
preferment of that interest over the property interest of the individ-
ual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing 
characteristics of every exercise of the police power which affects 
property."28 Although this broad reading of the police power domi-
nated post-Mugler takings law for some time, the Hadacheck v. Se-
bastian decision revealed early stages of the Court's uncertainty in 
those cases where landowners alleged total destruction of property 
values.29 In Hadacheck, the Supreme Court denied a brick kiln 
owner's due process challenge to a Los Angeles ordinance that pro-
hibited brick yards within designated areas of the city.30 Although 
upholding the ordinance as a valid exercise of California's police 
power, the Court explicitly noted that, while completely prohibiting 
24 See Connors, supra note 21, at 161. Such a sweeping view of the police power was perhaps 
crucial to Justice Harlan's analysis in Mugler, as the sale of liquor was not uniformly considered 
a nuisance. See id. 
25 See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915) (regulation depriving brick kiln opera-
tor of his business was nuisance in fact and therefore properly regulated); Reinman v. Little 
Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176 (1887) (livery stables, although not nuisances per se, were properly 
prohibited by regulation without compensation as nuisances "in fact and in law" based on the 
state's police power); see also Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928) (whether a regulation 
requiring the cutting of trees infected with "cedar rust" controlled a nuisance was irrelevant so 
long as the regulation was grounded in reasonable "considerations of social policy"). 
26 See Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 411; Reinman, 237 U.S. at 176; see also Miller, 276 U.S. at 280. 
27 See Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 410; Reinman, 237 U.S. at 176; see also Miller, 276 U.S. at 280. 
28 See Miller, 276 U.S. at 279-80; see also Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 408-09 (regulation was not 
invalid even though value of investments made in the brick kiln business prior to legislative 
action was greatly diminished). 
29 See Hadacheck, 239 U.S. a'. 412. 
30 See id. at 404. 
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the manufacture of bricks, the law did not prohibit other uses of the 
land such as the removal of subsurface brick clay.31 The Court then 
explicitly passed on whether it would have ruled differently had the 
ordinance worked a broader prohibition on the use of the land.s2 
The Court drew on Muglers broad poace power notions until Jus-
tice Holmes' landmark decision in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. 
Mahon.ss Pennsylvania Coal was the first case in which the Supreme 
Court invalidated a land-use regulation as applied to a landowner due 
in part to a substantial diminution in property values.34 In Pennsyl-
vania Coal, the Mahons, who had purchased property to which Penn-
sylvania Coal had retained subsurface mining rights, filed suit under 
the Kohler Act requesting injunctive relief from Pennsylvania Coal's 
further mining activities.35 Pennsylvania Coal countered by arguing 
that the Kohler Act was an invalid exercise of the police power that 
essentially worked a taking of their "support estate," or the portion 
of subsurface coal the statute required miners to leave in place for 
preventing subsidence.36 
In finding for Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes admitted that 
the police power was a necessary incident to the government's con-
tinued existence.37 He proposed, however, that the contracts and due 
process clauses of the Constitution should nevertheless work limits 
on a state's regulatory powers.38 A challenged regulation's resulting 
effect on property values set these limits: "When [diminution] reaches 
a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an 
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act."39 
81 See id. at 412. 
8ll See id. Justice McKenna thus distinguished the basis of his holding in Hadacheck from a 
California Supreme Court decision that invalidated a regulation because its effect was to 
"absolutely deprive the owners of real property within such limits of a valuable right incident 
to their ownership." See id. at 411-12 (citing Ex Parte Kelso, 82 P. 241 (Cal. 1905». 
88 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
34 See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 14, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003 (1992) (No. 91-453); see also Connors, supra note 21, at 177. 
85 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-13 (1922). The Kohler Act prohibited 
coal mining where subsidence would have adverse effects on dwellings. See id. at 413. Although 
the Mahons' deed had included an express provision allowing Pennsylvania Coal to mine under 
their land, they were assigned all the risks associated with the mining operations. See id. at 412. 
36 See id. at 412-16; FRED BOSSELMAN, THE TAKING ISSUE 131~2 (1973). 
87 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. Justice Holmes explicitly recognized that "govern-
ment could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished 
without paying for some change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed 
under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power." [d. 
88 See id. 
89 [d. This has come to be known as the "diminution in value" test, where the court essentially 
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Having established that diminution of property values worked a 
limit on the government's authority to regulate, Justice Holmes pro-
ceeded to balance the public interests protected by the Kohler Act 
with the private losses it exacted on Pennsylvania Coa1.40 In weighing 
the concerns of public safety purportedly furthered by the statute, he 
concluded that the Mahons' property interests were not sufficiently 
common or public enough to designate Pennsylvania Coal's mining 
activity a nuisance.41 The statute's ultimate effect on Pennsylvania 
Coal, however, was to "abolish" a "very valuable" mining estate by 
making a portion of its coal commercially impractical to mine.42 This 
loss, which seemed more severe when balanced against what he con-
sidered to be the relatively weak public benefit of the statute, led 
Justice Holmes to conclude that the Kohler Act could not be sustained 
as a legitimate exercise of the police power in so far as it affected coal 
mining in places where the right to mine coal was reserved.43 
In his dissent, Justice Brandeis criticized the majority's application 
of the diminution in value test.44 In determining the extent of diminu-
tion, Justice Brandeis argued, the value of Pennsylvania Coal's sup-
port estate should not be assessed separately.45 Rather, it should be 
compared "with the value of all other parts of the land."46 Justice 
Brandeis observed that the value of the coal kept in place by the 
calculates the value of the land in question before and after the regulation is applied. See Donald 
W. Large, The Supreme Court and the Taking Clause: The Search for a Better Rule, 18 ENVTL. 
L. J. 3,19-20 (1987). The court then calculates the percentage of decline in value to decide if the 
loss is severe enough to justify compensation. See id. 
40 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413-14. 
41 See id. at 413. In essence, Justice Holmes refused to apply the nuisance exception to the 
Kohler Act, reasoning that the source of damage to the Mahons' home was a private one and 
not "common or public." See id. He further posited that the Kohler Act was not justified as 
protecting public safety, since notice that subsidence would occur was sufficient to protect the 
public. See id. 
42 See id. at 414. 
43 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414. Justice Holmes refused in his analysis to recognize 
a distinction between the impact of physical appropriations of property, and property rendered 
valueless by governmental regulation. See id. at 415. Although he pronounced as a "general 
rule" that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will 
be recognized as a taking, "Justice Holmes provide no meaningful framework for deciding what 
is too far. See id. Rather, he simply posited that determining the point where enforcement of a 
regulation has the effect of a physical appropriation is a question of degree and "therefore cannot 
be disposed of by general propositions." See id. at 416. Exactly where a governmental action 
will fallon that spectrum will "::3pend[] on the particular facts." See id. at 413, 416. 
44 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
45 See id. 
46 See id. 
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Kohler Act was "negligible" when compared to the value of the whole 
property. The resulting diminution, therefore, was hardly the undue 
hardship that Pennsylvania Coal had alleged.47 These criticisms at-
tempted to expose the majority's lack of guidance in applying the 
"diminution" test, and the Pennsylvania Coal dissent would initiate 
a marked level of uncertainty in future takings jurisprudence.48 
In the 1962 decision of Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, the Court 
retreated from Pennsylvania Coal's pro-takings pronouncements, 
but provided no concrete standards in their place.49 In an effort to 
regulate mining, Hempstead had enacted an ordinance prohibiting 
mining below the water table of a neighboring lake, and mandating 
that any excavations below that table be refilled.5O The petitioners 
argued that the ordinance worked an uncompensated taking of their 
property because it restricted mining on eighteen acres of their land.51 
In writing for the majority, Justice Clark refused to recognize that a 
taking had occurred. He agreed that the ultimate effect of the regu-
lation was to render any further mining impossible, thereby "com-
pletely prohibit[ing] a beneficial use to which the [petitioners'] prop-
erty ha[d] previously been devoted."52 However, despite 
Pennsylvania Coal's holding that the degree of economic injury 
should factor into the Court's takings analysis, Justice Clark, drawing 
heavily from Mugler, chose to focus mainly on the extent to which the 
town's ordinance was a reasonable exercise of the police power.53 
Although an assessment of property value diminution was relevant 
under Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Clark posited it was ''by no means 
47 See id. 
48 See id. at 416; Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Test Is Still a Muddle, 
57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 566 (1984). Professor Rose postulates that Justice Holmes' diminution 
in value test fails to provide guidance in answering how much diminution is too much, or exactly 
what loss of property within an estate is relevant to the takings discussion. See id. Although 
Holmes' analysis was unclear, the critical factor in his decision may indeed have been the 
extensiveness of the economic harm imposed by the regulation. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and 
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 41 (1964). For other courts that have held similarly, see 
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (if the exercise of the police 
power makes a property ''wholly useless, the right of property would prevail over the other 
public interest, and the police power would fail"); Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 
207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907) ("the question [of whether a tax is too burdensome] narrows itself to the 
magnitude of the burden imposed"). 
49 See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). 
60 See id. at 592. 
61 See id. 
62 See idoo at 592, 596-97. 
63 See id. at 592, 593. 
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conclusive" as to the constitutional question of whether a taking had 
occurred.54 Justice Clark did, however, attempt to reconcile the appar-
ent inconsistencies of the Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal decisions 
by concluding that the reasonableness of Hempstead's ordinance 
could be determined by the nature of the harm prevented, the avail-
ability of other less drastic alternatives, and the loss suffered by the 
property owners due to its enforcement.56 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City was the most 
important attempt after Goldblatt to reconcile the Mugler and Penn-
sylvania Coal ambiguities.56 The Penn Central dispute concerned 
New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law, which empowered a 
city commission to designate certain buildings as landmarks, and to 
exercise veto power over any proposed architectural modifications.57 
In 1967, the commission designated New York City's Grand Central 
Terminal an historic landmark, and later refused to approve Penn 
Central's request for permission to build a multi-story office building 
above it.58 Penn Central responded by alleging that the city, in refus-
ing to approve the addition, had taken its property without just 
compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.59 
In upholding the validity of the Landmarks Law, Justice Brennan 
held that the Court must consider three factors in reviewing a regu-
latory takings case: the character of the government action involved;60 
the extent to which the regulation interferes with investment-backed 
expectations;61 and the economic impact of the regulation upon the 
54 See Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594. 
65 See id. at 595. However, whether or not Justice Clark's opinion actually followed or repudi-
ated Pennsylvania Coal's diminution doctrine remains unclear. See id. at 594; see also Sax, 
supra note 48, at 43. Although the Hempstead regulation survived Justice Clark's inquiries, 
Goldblatt did not present an appropriate instance for the Court to determine how much dimi-
nution in value a regulation can impose before a taking occurs. See Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594. 
Because Justice Clark found no evidence that "even remotely suggest[ed] that prohibition of 
further mining [would have] reduce[ d] the value of the lot in question," he focused mainly on 
whether the ordinance was a valid exercise of the town's police power. See id. In fact, the record 
in Goldblatt was evidently not complete enough for the Court to have considered whether the 
regulation at issue even worked a diminution of the land as severe as the mine owners had 
alleged. See id.; see also, Connors, supra note 21, at 181 n.223. 
66 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
57 See id. at 110-11. 
58 See id. at 115, 116-17. 
59 See id. at 119. 
60 See id. Justice Brennan distinguished regulatory takings from instances where government 
regulations can be characterized as "physical invasion[s]". See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946». 
61 See Ausness, supra note 7 at 371 n.181. The term "investment-backed expectations" ap-
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property owner.62 Before applying this formula to Penn Central's case, 
however, Justice Brennan acknowledged outright the Supreme 
Court's long history of upholding land use regulations that were rea-
sonably related to the health, safety, morals, or general welfare, even 
in cases where real property interests were "destroyed or adversely 
affected."63 Justice Brennan then dismissed Penn Central's claim that 
the city's restriction could constitute a taking of one discreet property 
interest, or, in Penn Central's case, the air rights necessary for the 
proposed expansion: "'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single 
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether 
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated."64 
After recognizing the constitutionality of the Landmarks Law,56 
Justice Brennan examined its interference with Penn Central's in-
vestment-backed expectations.66 He noted that Penn Central's initial 
expectations in purchasing the property were based on its use as a 
railroad terminal, and that this interest was not affected by the stat-
ute.67 The statute's economic impact was therefore not severe enough 
to exceed constitutional boundaries.68 Justice Brennan further noted 
pearing in Justice Brennan's opinion was apparently first coined by Professor Frank Michelman 
in 1967. See id.; Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1233 (1967). 
62 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
63 See id. at 125 (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928». Justice Brennan 
reasoned similarly the following year in Andrus v. Allard: "Suffice it to say that government 
regulation-by definition-involves the adjustment of rights for the public good. Often this 
adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Th 
require compensation in all such circumstances would effectively compel the government to 
regulate by purchase." [d. (emphasis in original). See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979). 
64 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. Justice Brennan noted that the Court should focus on 
the regulation's interference with rights in the parcel as a whole. See id. at 130-31; Andrus, 444 
U.S. at 65-66 (holding that "where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the 
destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed 
in its entirety"). 
65 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125. Justice Brennan acknowledged that zoning laws such as 
the one at issue in Penn Central could be reasonably related to the public health, safety, morals 
or general welfare. See id. 
66 See id. at 136. Although Justice Brennan employed the term ''investment-backed expecta-
tions" in a conclusory fashion, he avoided any specific explanation of its meaning. See Large, 
supra note 39, at 26. 
67 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136. 
63 See id. Professor Large writes of the inherent difficulty in determining investment-backed 
expectations, a phrase commonly used in a conclusory fashion after Penn Central. See Large, 
supra note 39, at 26. Large notes that Penn Central's proposed project may have indeed been 
within its investment-backed expectations, as the original Grand Central Station was erected 
with pillars that were of sufficient strength to sustain an office building above the station. See 
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that the Landmarks Law did not affect the present uses of the termi-
nal, and moreover that the commission's denial of Penn Central's 
application did not restrict all construction above it.69 
The next important Supreme Court takings decision was the 1980 
case of Agins v. Tiburon, in which landowners alleged that zoning 
ordinances restricting development of their parcels to a limited num-
ber of residential units effected an unconstitutional taking of their 
property.70 The landowners in Agins argued that the ordinance's den-
sity restrictions had "completely destroyed the value of [their] prop-
erty for any purpose or use whatsoever."71 
In rejecting the landowners' challenge, Justice Powell posited that 
a regulatory taking can only occur either when a regulation does not 
"substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies the owner 
economically viable use of his land."72 Applying this two-part analysis, 
Justice Powell first upheld the Tiburon ordinance as a legitimate 
exercise of the city's police power to protect its residents from ''the 
premature and unnecessary conversion of open-space land to urban 
uses."73 He then applied the "economically viable use" analysis to 
conclude that the landowners were still free under the ordinance to 
fulfill their "reasonable investment expectations" by building up to 
five residences on their property.74 Justice Powell thus rejected the 
landowners' claim that the value of their property was completely 
destroyed by the ordinance.75 
The Supreme Court applied the Agins two-part test nine years 
later in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, a case with 
id. Indeed, an office building may have in fact been planned for possible future development. 
See id. 
69 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136-37. 
70 See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 254, 259 (1980). Although Justice Powell did not explain how 
he interpreted "economically viable use," a phrase first used by Justice Brennan in Penn 
Central, Justice Scalia would later rely on this principle in formulating his takings rule in Lucas. 
See Ausness, supra note 7, at 374; see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1016 (1992). 
71 See Agins, 447 U.S. at 258. 
72 See id. at 260 (emphasis supplied) (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 
104,138 n.36 (1978». In other wc~ds, either prong of the Agins test, if proven, would be sufficient 
to establish a taking. See Ausness, supra note 7, at 373. 
73 See Agins, 447 U.S. at 261 (quoting CAL. GOVT. CODE ANN. § 65661(b) (West. Supp. 1979». 
Some scholars have since criticized Justice Powell for requiring the "substantially advancing 
state interests" test for takings, as this requirement was, until Agins, only associated with the 
Court's substantive due process analysis. See Norman Williams, Jr. et aI., The White River 
Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193,213-14 n.64 (1984). 
74 See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262. 
75 See id. at 262. 
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facts strikingly similar to Pennsylvania Coal.76 In Keystone, a group 
of miners challenged the Subsidence Act, a statute that restricted 
mining in certain areas that were vulnerable to subsidence.77 The 
miners, asserting "no more than a straightforward application of the 
Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal," argued that the statute 
worked a taking of their support estate, or the twenty-seven million 
tons of coal that the statute required to be left in place.78 
Justice Stevens, after applying the Agins two-part test, refused to 
recognize a taking.79 Stating that the purpose of a regulation played 
a "critical" role in determining whether iii. taking had occurred, Justice 
Stevens noted that the Subsidence Act legitimately protected valid 
public interests.80 He further concluded that the statute fit the nui-
sance exception because of its health, safety, conservation, and fiscal 
integrity purposes.81 
Then, in applying the second prong of the Agins test, Justice 
Stevens asked whether the petitioners had suffered "deprivation sig-
nificant enough to satisfy the heavy burden on one alleging a regula-
tory taking."82 Did the statute serve to make the mining of certain 
coal "commercially impracticable," as was the case in Pennsylvania 
Coal?83 However, rather than view the petitioners' twenty-seven mil-
76 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
77 See id. at 476, 478-79. The statute was entitled the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land 
Conservation Act, PA. STAT . .ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.1 (Purdon 1986). See id. at 474. 
78 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 478-79, 481, 496 (1987). 
Pennsylvania law recognized three estates in mining land-the support estate, the surface 
estate, and the mineral estate-as separate property interests. See id. at 478-79. Petitioners 
argued that the coal supports they needed to leave in place as the "support estate" had been 
effectively appropriated, as coal served no useful purpose unless mined. See id. at 496-97. 
79 See id. at 492. 
80 See id.; see also Connors, supra note 21, at 144. 
81 See KeysUme, 480 U.S. at 488; Connors, supra note 21, at 145. Justice Stevens observed 
further that the statute at issue in Keystone was distinguishable from the statute in Pennsyl-
vania Cool, which the Court had invalidated in part because of its private benefit to surface 
property owners. See KeysUme, 480 U.S. at 486. He noted that the purpose of the statute in 
KeysUme was the protection of public safety, the enhancement of land values for taxation, and 
the preservation of surface water drainage and public water supplies. See id. at 485--86. In fact, 
Justice Stevens may have overplayed this distinction from Pennsylvania Coal, as even the 
Kohler Act was intended to "cure existing evils and abuses" such as ''wrecked and dangerous 
streets and highways, collapsed public buildings, churches, schools, factories, streets and private 
dwellings, broken gas, water and sewer systems, the loss of human life .... " See Large, supra 
note 39, at 36 (quoting Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 492 (pa. 1922». Indeed, key 
provisions of the Subsidence Act were identical to the Kohler Act. See Richard A. Epstein, 
Thkings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 12 (1987). 
82 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,493 (1987). 
86 See id. 
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lion tons of coal as one appropriated property interest, Justice 
Stevens, following the Pennsylvania Coal dissent, noted that the 
Subsidence Act required that the petitioners leave only less than two 
per cent of their entire coal supply in place.84 He therefore was not 
convinced that the petitioners' "mining operations, or even any spe-
cific mines, were at all unprofitable since the Subsidence Act was 
passed."86 In so reasoning, Justice Stevens considered that the peti-
tioners' "support estate," although deprived of profitability, was 
merely a part of the "entire bundle of rights" possessed by the owners 
of either the coal or the surface.86 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist took issue with the major-
ity's attempts to distinguish Keystone from Pennsylvania Coal by 
arguing that the statutes in both cases were aimed at similar economic 
goals.87 Although he agreed that the Subsidence Act was a legitimate 
exercise of the police power, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the 
majority's classification of subsidence as a nuisance.86 For the Court 
to invoke the nuisance exception to deny a takings claim, he argued, 
the challenged regulation must rest on the "discrete and narrow" 
purpose of preventing a nuisance.89 Because the Subsidence Act ex-
isted primarily for economic purposes, it could not be insulated from 
constitutional due process considerations.90 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
noted further that Keystone was unlike other "nuisance" cases such 
84 See ill. at 496. 
86 See ill. Justice Stevens also found that the Act had a negligible impact on petitioners' 
investment-backed expectations by noting that only 75% of the petitioners' coal could have been 
profitably mined in any event: "The question here is whether there has been any taking at all 
when no coal has been physically appropriated, and the regulatory program places a burden on 
the use of only a small fraction of the property that is subject to regulation." See ill. at 499-500 
n.27. 
86 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 501. In fact, Justice Stevens disputed even that the support estate 
itself was entirely deprived of profitability. See ill. He noted that, in any event, the petitioners' 
record lacked any evidence of what percentage of the support estate, either in the aggregate 
or with respect to any individual estate, was actually affected by the Act. See ill. He also cited 
Penn Central, which rejected the notion that the "air rights" above the petitioner's terminal 
constituted a separate segment of property for takings purposes. See ill. at 500. 
87 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 510 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
86 See ill. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
89 See ill. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist was not specific as to whether 
the regulation should prevent a nuisance as recognized a priori by state law. See ill. (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting). 
90 See ill. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Indeed, although the majority did acknowledge that 
the nuisance exception was not coterminous with the police power itself, under Justice Stevens' 
reasoning in Keystone arguably all statutes which abate something similar to a public nuisance 
might ultimately fit the nuisance exception. See Connors, supra note 21, at 145. 
444 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:431 
as Mugler, Miller, and Goldblatt, because in those cases the claimants 
did not suffer complete extinction of property values.91 Mter describ-
ing the unmined coal in Keystone as an "identifiable and separable 
property interest," he concluded that the Subsidence Act essentially 
appropriated this entire interest in violation of the Takings Clause.92 
II. THE LUCAS DECISION AND SOME FEDERAL INTERPRETATIONS 
A. The Lucas Case 
In June of 1992, the Supreme Court dr-.:cided Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council.93 In 1986, petitioner David Lucas purchased two 
residential lots on a South Carolina barrier island for $975,000.94 At 
the time of the purchase, neither lot was subject to regulation under 
the existing Coastal Management Act.96 A 1988 amendment to the 
Act, however, flatly prohibited any construction of "occupiable im-
provements" in an area extending between the ocean and a baseline 
that was landward of Lucas' lots.96 Lucas then filed suit in the South 
Carolina Court of Common Pleas, alleging that the regulation effected 
a taking of his property without just compensation.97 The court, agree-
ing that the amendment "deprived Lucas of any reasonable economic 
91 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 513-14 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist 
noted further that the Court had never applied the nuisance exception to allow complete 
extinction of property values. See id. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For later cases in 
which federal courts that have held likewise, see McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668 
(9th Cir. 1991) ("We cannot agree that any legitimate purpose automatically trumps the depri-
vation of all economically viable use .... "); see also Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 
F.2d 1169, 1176 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
92 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 517-18 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In a footnote, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist briefly reconciled the apparent contradiction of his reasoning with that of the major-
ity in Penn Central. See id. at 517 n.5 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). He noted that in Penn 
Central, unlike in Keystone, although the majority held that '''Taking' jurisprudence does not 
divide a single parcel into discreet segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a 
particular segment have been entirely abrogated," the Court acknowledged that there were 
other uses for the air rights. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 105,130--31 (1978». 
98 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
94 See id. at 1()(XH)7. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. at 1008--09. The Act did allow some "nonhabitable" improvements, such as wooden 
walkways and wooden decks. See id. at 1009 n.2. The purpose of the amendment was to control 
the eroding shoreline, which had been changing significantly over the previous forty years. See 
Ausness, supra note 7, at 387. 
97 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009. Lucas did not contest the validity of the Act as a lawful exercise 
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use of his lots [by] render[ing] them valueless," awarded him more 
than $1.2 million in damages.98 
The South Carolina Supreme Court, relying mainly on Mugler's 
broad police power notions, reversed.99 The court perceived the Act's 
purpose to be the preservation of the shoreline and thus the preven-
tion of serious public harm,uJO It therefore held that the Takings 
Clause did not require compensation, regardless of the Act's effect on 
Lucas' property values.101 Moreover, because he never contested the 
validity of the Act itself, the court ruled that Lucas had implicitly 
conceded that the proposed use of his land would be harmful and thus 
within the noxious use exception to the Takings ClauseY12 
The dissenters, on the other hand, read the Mugler line of cases as 
recognizing that states have the authority to regulate without com-
pensation only when acting primarily to prevent public nuisances and 
"noxious uses" of property.103 Reasoning that the primary purpose of 
the South Carolina Act was not the prevention of a public nuisance, 
the dissenters argued that, in Lucas' case, compensation was consti-
tutionally required.104 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and Justice 
Scalia delivered the opinion for a bare majority in reversing the South 
Carolina Supreme Court.106 Justice Scalia commenced his analysis by 
describing the two scenarios in which the Supreme Court had applied 
the Takings Clause.106 The first scenario involved physical invasions 
of the police power, but rather claimed that, because the value of his property was completely 
extinguished, he was entitled to compensation regardless of the Act's objectives. See id. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. at 1009-10; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887). 
100 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009-10. 
101 See id. at 1010. 
102 See Ausness, supra note 7, at 388. 
103 See id. For an in-depth view of the nuisance exception in post-Mugler takings cases, see 
generally Connors, supra note 21, at 160--85. 
104 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1010 (1992). The dissenters 
posited that the chief purpose of the regulation was rather the promotion of tourism and the 
creation of a "habitat for indigenous flora and fauna." See id. (citing Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 906 (S.C. 1991». 
106 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1005. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
White, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Thomas. See id. 
106 See id. at 1015-16. However, Justice Scalia first needed to address whether Lucas' case 
was not yet ripe for review because of 1990 amendments that provided additional administrative 
avenues for his permit applications. See id. at 1010-11. Invoking First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, Justice Scalia reasoned that even 
though Lucas was now able to apply for construction permits, he nevertheless may have 
suffered past deprivation for having been denied construction rights during the period before 
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or appropriations of private property.107 The second involved regula-
tory denials of "all economically beneficial or productive use of land.mos 
Justice Scalia concluded that in both cases compensation is necessary 
lest states use the excuse of preventing serious public harm to force 
a landowner into public service through regulation.109 He then ac-
cepted the South Carolina trial court's conclusion that Lucas' land was 
rendered valueless by the Act.110 
Next, Justice Scalia asserted that the Court's past deference to the 
states' police power in denying takings claims provided no meaningful 
framework in which to decide when compensation is due a burdened 
landowner.111 Moreover, he reasoned, denying a total takings claim 
based solely on broad police power notions would be an entire depar-
ture from the Court's past adherence to the "categorical rule that total 
regulatory takings must be compensated."112 Past decisions such as 
Mugler, Hadacheck and Goldblatt, where police power justifications 
were used to justify burdensome regulations, were entirely consistent 
with the rule because none of the landowners in those cases alleged 
complete elimination of property values.113 
Justice Scalia thus concluded that states could justify the non-com-
pensable, complete devaluation of property only where the prohibited 
use was "not part of [the owner's] title to begin with."114 In other 
the amendments came into effect. See id. at 1011-12 (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that temporary 
deprivations of use may be compensable under the Takings Clause». 
107 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 
U.S. 419, 435-40 (1982) (holding that law requiring landowners to allow television cable compa-
nies to place cable facilities in their apartments constituted a taking regardless of the minimal 
occupations of property». 
108 See id. at 1015-16 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 254, 260 (1980». 
109 See id. at 1017. He continued: "[T]otal deprivation is, from the landowner's point of view, 
the equivalent ofa physical appropriation." Id. Justice Scalia worried that regulations that leave 
land without "economically beneficial or productive options" for its use carry with them a 
''heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service under 
the guise of mitigating serious public harm." See id. at 1018. 
110 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020 n.9. Justice Scalia noted that the respondents did not contest 
that Lucas' land was rendered valueless. Justice Scalia, however, did not hold as such. See id; 
Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Issues in Light of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A 
Decision Full of Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 439, 455 (1993). In 
fact, not a single justice aside from Justice Scalia appeared to accept Lucas's claim of total 
deprivation. See STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 265 (1996). 
111 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026. 
112 See id. Justice Scalia reasoned that, under the noxious rule test, "departure [from the 
categorical rule] would always be allowed" and would thus "nullify Mahon's affirmation of limits 
to the noncompensable exercise of the police power." See id. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. at 1027. 
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words, the total devaluation of property will not require compensation 
when the regulated activity would violate background principles of a 
state's property or nuisance law already in existence.u5 In order to 
survive a takings claim, therefore, a regulation must "do no more than 
duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts [or] 
by adjacent landowners ... under the State's law of private nuisance, 
or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances 
that affect the public generally, or otherwise."u6 Justice Scalia then 
remanded Lucas to the South Carolina courts to determine whether 
any such background nuisance principles justified the strict regulation 
of Lucas' property.ll7 
Justice Kennedy, although concurring in the judgment, expressed 
reservations about the trial court's assumption that Lucas' land was 
rendered totally valueless by the Act.uS Moreover, he stressed that 
precedent required an analysis of the Act's impact on Lucas' invest-
ment-backed expectations in the context of a greater deference to the 
state's police power than Justice Scalia was willing to recognize: 
I do not believe [that nuisance law] can be the sole source of state 
authority to impose severe restrictions. Coastal property may 
present such unique concerns for a fragile land system that the 
State can go further in regulating its development and use than 
the common law of nuisance might otherwise permitY9 
Justice Blackmun's dissent took issue with the majority's willing-
ness to restrict a state's authority to promUlgate regulations that 
protect life and property.120 Citing Mugler, Hadacheck, Miller, Gold-
blatt and Penn Central, Justice Blackmun argued that the Court's 
115 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. As examples of such laws, Justice Scalia described the 
prohibition on building nuclear plants and restrictions on a landfilling operations that would 
have the effect of flooding neighboring property. See id. 
116 See id. Justice Scalia implied that common law principles will rarely prohibit the "essential" 
uses of land. See id. at 1031 (quoting Curtis v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911». Moreover, he 
cautioned that legislatures must do more than merely allude to general common law principles 
in order to avoid takings. See id. at 1031. Rather, a state must employ the same common-law 
nuisance principles as it would have used had it decided to bring a nuisance action against the 
owner. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031; see also Ausness, supra note 7, at 39. 
117 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031-32. On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court was not able 
to find any "background principle" for the regulation of Lucas' land. See Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992). 
118 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1033-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
119 See id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Indeed, Justice Scalia did acknowledge that 
nuisance law was of an evolving nature: "[ C]hanged circumstances or new knowledge may make 
what was previously permissible no longer so." See id. at 1031. 
120 See id. at 1039-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1987». 
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rejections of earlier takings claims were appropriately premised on 
its deference to the states' police power.121 Furthermore, he argued, 
total devaluation alone had never emerged in the Court's analysis as 
a sufficient basis for recognizing a regulatory taking.122 Rather, the 
Supreme Court had consistently shunned categorical takings rules in 
favor of ad hoc determinations that balanced the government's inter-
est in prohibiting activities against the private costs imposed on the 
landowner.l23 Justice Blackmun further noted the extent to which the 
majority's categorical "deprivation of all economically viable use" rule 
could yield subjective results depending on the Court's definition of 
property.l24 Finally, Justice Blackmun took issue with the majority's 
emphasis on the importance of background, judge-made nuisance 
principles in forming a "value-free" takings jurisprudence.126 Reason-
ing that judges form common-law nuisance principles using the same 
rational thought processes and balancing tests as legislators, Justice 
Blackmun considered the majority's quest for a "value-free" takings 
jurisprudence to be tenuous at best.126 
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, stressed that the majority's 
desire for a categorical takings rule was inconsistent with Justice 
Holmes' pronouncement in Pennsylvania Coal that absolute rules "ill 
fit" the regulatory takings inquiry.127 In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice 
121 See id. at 1047-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978); Goldblatt v. 'Ibwn of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,596 (1962); Miller 
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 394 (1915); Mugler 
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887». 
122 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1047 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun discredited the 
majority's reliance on Agins' dicta for its ''total deprivation" categorical rule by observing that 
neither Agins nor its progeny ever suggested that the public interest was irrelevant upon the 
taking of total value. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1049--50 n.11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
123 See id. at 1047 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
124 See id. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Citing Keystone, Justice Blackmun described 
inconsistencies in the Court's past decisions concerning the extent to which the "denominator" 
in the takings fraction should represent the property as a whole or merely the burdened portion. 
See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
125 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
126 See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He further stated: "There is nothing magical in the 
reasoning of judges long dead. They determined a harm in the same way as state judges and 
legislatures do today." [d. at 1055 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Indeed, while at the heart of Justice 
Scalia's analysis is a criticism of the subjective inquiries which underlie a state's determination 
of harm, the fact that he supported the same SUbjective inquiry to define a nuisance (i.e. the 
degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the 
claimant's activities) has been criticized as a glaring analytical flaw which undercuts the value 
of his opinion. See Sugameli, supra note 110, at 459-60; see also Wllliam W. Fisher III, The 
Trouble with LucaB, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1406-{)7 (1993). 
127 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1063 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Stevens claimed, economic injury was only "[o]ne fact for considera-
tion in determining [the] limits" of a regulation.128 Furthermore, he 
argued, Justice Scalia's "total deprivation" test was only undermined 
by its potentially arbitrary impact on landowners.129 Under that test, 
some landowners would be compensated for the total deprivation of 
their property, while others would receive nothing for slightly less 
severe devaluations.13o Finally, Justice Stevens stressed that an as-
sessment of the "character of the regulatory action" was important to 
the takings inquiry.13l He reasoned that the Just Compensation Clause 
was designed to prevent those inequities arising when certain indi-
viduals are singled out to bear "public burdens which should, in all 
fairness and justice, be borne by the public as a whole."l32 Justice 
Stevens concluded that Lucas should not be compensated because the 
purpose of the South Carolina act was not to single him out, but rather 
to conform with a federally-initiated national effort to protect the 
coastline.133 
B. Recent Federal Court Interpretations of Some Lucas 
Ambiguities 
Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, and Loveladies 
Harbor, Inc. v. United States are two Federal Circuit decisions that 
have attempted to clarify certain Lucas ambiguities. l34 In Florida 
Rock, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
128 See id. at 1063 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393, 413 (1922». 
129 See id. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
130 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
131 See id. at 1071 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
132 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1071 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960». Stevens considered physical appropriations to be entirely consistent with 
this principle. See id. at 1073 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
133 See id. at 1074-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens observed as well that the 
Coastal Management Act, because it imposed substantial burdens on many landowners, was 
thus more like the Subsidence Act in Keystone than the Kohler Act in Pennsylvania Coal. See 
id. at 1075 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He also noted that Justice Scalia's test had an inequi-
table impact on owners of developed land as compared to owners of undeveloped land. See id. 
at 1075 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens reasoned that Lucas provided no possible 
remedies for owners of developed land who, because of the restrictive nature of the Act, 
were not allowed either to rebuild damage to their properties or maintain existing barriers of 
protection to keep those properties from deteriorating. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1075 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
134 See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Florida Rock 
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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addressed the "partial taking" conundrum that Justice Stevens rec-
ognized as a glaring inequity in Lucas' "total deprivation" categorical 
takings rule: How can courts distinguish those instances where a state 
can legitimately diminish the value of property from those where 
compensation for less than full diminution may be constitutionally 
required ?136 
In Florida Rock, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a 
property owner's successful allegation in the Court of Federal Claims 
that the Army Corps of Engineers' denial of a permit to mine under 
his wetlands amounted to a compensable taking.l36 The Appeals Court 
disagreed that the landowner was denied all economically beneficial 
uses of his land, and remanded back to the Claims Court to determine 
whether the denial of only "a certain proportion" ofthe economic uses 
of land could in fact effect a partial regulatory taking.137 In so doing, 
the Florida Rock court noted that the Fifth Amendment did not 
narrow compensation only to those cases where claimants allege a 
total deprivation of value.l38 Indeed, the court explained, a regulatory 
taking can result in "less than a taking of the property owner's entire 
fee estate," as by eminent domain the government is free to take any 
kind of estate or fee interest in property.l39 
Then the Florida Rock court suggested that, to determine whether 
less than full devaluations amount to partial takings, courts should 
examine whether legislatures were ''responsible'' and "reasonabl[e]" 
in regulating the use of property.l40 Courts should then reject partial 
takings claims when regulations result in "shared economic impacts" 
186 See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1568. Florida Rock explicitly recognized that if a regulation 
prohibits less than all economically beneficial use of the land and causes at most a partial 
destruction of its value, the case does not come within the liucas categorical takings rule. See 
id. at 1565. The first question addressed by Florida Rock, therefore, was whether a regulation 
"must destroy a certain proportion of a property's economic use of value in order for a compen-
sable taking to occur." See id. at 1568. The second was how to determine, in any given case, 
what that proportion is. See id. These questions were explicitly left unresolved by Lucas, as 
Justice Scalia accepted the South Carolina trial court's conclusion that Lucas' land was deprived 
of all economic value. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 n.7 
(1992); see also Richard A. Epstein, liucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Thngled Web 
of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1375, 1387-92 (1993). 
186 See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1562. The Claims Court ruled that a compensable taking had 
occurred because without the permits the value of the claimant's property was "negligible" and 
that mining was its only viable economic use. See id. at 1563. 
137 See id. at 1567. 
138 See id. at 1568. 
139 See id. at 1572. 
140 See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1571. 
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and landowners derive benefits from the very regulations that inhibit 
the use of their land.141 However, the mere fact that a regulation 
legitimately promotes the public interest will not automatically re-
lieve the government from takings liability, as "the takings clause 
already assumes the government is acting in the public interest."142 
In sum, argued the court, the proper inquiry is whether the regulation 
reasonably benefits the plaintiff without unduly singling him out for 
the benefit of the community. 143 
Shortly after deciding Florida Rock, the Federal Circuit attempted 
to resolve the "denominator" issue reopened by Lucas.l44 In Love-
ladies, the court addressed the question of whether the entire parcel 
or the burdened parcel of land should be relevant to the "diminution 
of value" equation in the court's regulatory takings analysis. l46 The 
petitioner in that case owned a 250 acre lot, and sought state and 
federal permits under the Clean Water Act to build residences on 
fifty-one undeveloped acres of that lot.146 As part of a compromise with 
the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), 
the landowner agreed to donate almost thirty-nine acres of the fifty-
one acre lot to the state of New Jersey in exchange for a permit to 
develop the remaining twelve and one-half acres.147 The Army Corps 
of Engineers, however, later denied the permit after the NJDEP 
decided it was not in compliance with state requirements.148 The land-
owner alleged that the denial effected a regulatory taking.149 
In upholding the landowner's claim, the Loveladies court inter-
preted Lucas and its precedent to require courts, when reviewing a 
141 See id. at 1570. 
142 See id. at 1571 n.28 (citing Lucas' proposition that South Carolina's simple assertions that 
its regulations were in the public interest could not excuse it from takings liability). See id.; 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992). 
143 See FlorilUL Rock, 18 F.3d. at 1571 ("In short, has the Government acted in a responsible 
way, limiting the constraints on property ownership to those necessary to achieve the public 
purpose, and not allocating to some number of individuals, less than all, a burden that should 
be borne by all?"). Indeed, the FlorilUL Rock court admitted that its decision did not provide a 
bright line test, but rather continued the tradition of ad lwc takings decision making. See id. 
But it also predicted that "[olver time, enough cases will be decided with sufficient care and 
clarity that the line will more clearly emerge." See id. at 1571. 
144 See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Lucas, 
505 U.S. at 1016-17 n. 7. 
145 See Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1179--81. 
146 See id. at 1173-74. Nearly 200 acres of the landowner's original parcel had already been 
developed prior to the Clean Water Act's restrictions. See id. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. at 1174. 
149 See Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1174. 
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takings claim, to undertake an analysis both of the extent of denial of 
economically viable use inflicted by the regulation, and the regula-
tion's basis in state nuisance law.l60 A crucial question bearing on the 
devaluation assessment in Loveladies, therefore, was whether the 
twelve and one-half acre parcel or the landowner's entire parcel 
should serve as the denominator in the value-lost equation.151 
In its analysis, the court first concluded that the landowner's 250 
acre parcel could not reasonably serve as the denominator since New 
Jersey had made no effort to impose any land use restrictions on the 
property until after the first 200 acres were developed.l52 The court 
then reasoned that the remaining fifty-one acres should also not serve 
as the denominator, since thirty-eight and one-half acres ofthat parcel 
were deeded to the State of New Jersey pursuant to a prior agree-
ment: "It would seem ungrateful in the extreme to require Loveladies 
to convey to the public the rights in the 38.5 acres in exchange for the 
right to develop 12.5 acres, and then to include the value of the 
grant as a charge against the givers."l53 The court thus reached the 
conclusion that the permit denial amounted to a total taking because 
the "relevant parcel" had been deprived of "all economically feasible 
use."l54 The court also determined that because New Jersey had enti-
tled the landowner to fill his wetlands under the original regulatory 
scheme, it could not now claim takings immunity under parallel nui-
sance law.l55 
III. REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS 
A. Early Nuisance Exception and Broad Police Power Notions 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has reviewed regula-
tory takings allegations since the 1846 case of Commonwealth v. 
160 See id. at 1179. 
151 See id. at 1180. For an in-depth discussion of the denominator issue in determining com-
pensability Bee Michelman, supra note 51, at 1192, 1193. 
162 See Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1181. 
168 See id. 
154 See id. at 1182-83. The trial court had found that the 12.5 acre parcel had a value of 
$2,658,000 without the regulation and $12,500 with it-a diminution in value of 99%. See id. at 
1178. 
165 See id. at 1183. Thus, by issuing the permit, the NJDEP had essentially established that 
the project was not a nuisance under state law. See LoveladieB, 28 F .3d. at 1183. Furthermore, 
the court found no evidence showing that the state could have invoked existing nuisance law to 
prevent the filling. See id. 
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Tewksbury and the 1851 case of Commonwealth v. Alger.l66 In both 
cases, the court's analysis turned both on the validity of challenged 
regulations under the police power and a state's inherent authority to 
regulate nuisances without compensation.157 
In Tewksbury, a Chelsea landowner challenged a statute that pro-
hibited the removal of sand and gravel from town beaches.l58 As an 
owner of property within the regulated areas, the landowner claimed 
that the statute was unconstitutional and void because it effected an 
uncompensated taking of his private resources for a public benefit.159 
In upholding the statute, Chief Justice Shaw argued that it was a 
legitimate exercise of the legislature to "regulate and restrain such 
particular use of property as would be inconsistent with, or injurious 
to, the rights of the public."160 Chief Justice Shaw then explicitly 
addressed the government's power to impose just restraints without 
compensation on activities that were "nuisance[s] at common law."161 
He posited that the protection of the beaches for navigation, either 
by preventing a landowner from "cut[ ting] away the embankment on 
his own land" and "divert[ing] the watercourse so as to render it too 
shallow for navigation," or from "removing the soil composing a natu-
ral embankment to a valuable, navigable stream, port or harbor," 
represented the types of regulation for which no compensation was 
required.162 Chief Justice Shaw did not discuss the significance of 
residual use, if any, left to the landowner's property by such regula-
tions.l63 
156 See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53 (1851); Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. 55 
(1846). 
167 See Alger, 61 Mass. at 86; Twksbury, 52 Mass. at 57. 
168 See Tewksbury, 52 Mass. at 55. 
169 See id. at 55. The object of the statute was to protect Boston Harbor by preserving both 
its natural embankments and the integrity of surrounding beaches. See id. at 56. The landowner 
brought the action under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights Pt. 1 Art. 10: "[Njo part of 
the property of any individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to public uses, 
without his consent, or that of the representative body of the people .... And whenever the 
public exigencies require that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public 
uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor." See id.; MASS. CONST. Pt. 1 Art. 10. 
160 See Tewksbury, 52 Mass. at 57. 
161 See id. at 57. 
162 See id. at 57, 59. Chief Justice Shaw also implied that these inquiries are fact specific, and 
noted that ''there are many cases where the things done in particular places, or under a 
particular state of facts, would be injurious, when, under a change of circumstances, the same 
would be quite harmless." See id. at 57. 
163 See generally id. at 55-59. 
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Five years later in Commonwealth v. Alger, the Supreme Judicial 
Court reviewed a claim by a Boston Harbor oceanfront resident who 
was prohibited from building a wharf beyond statutorily established 
limits.lM The statute, enacted to facilitate navigation, explicitly de-
clared any construction beyond the boundary a public nuisance.166 
In arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as applied, Alger 
claimed that, although the government's authority to prevent nui-
sances without threat of compensation was well-established at com-
mon law, the statute at issue was not enacted for the purpose of 
preventing a nuisance.l66 Rather, he argued, the statute simply estab-
lished and enforced the channel line and prevented encroachments 
thereon.167 Alger further considered it relevant that the 1641 colonial 
grant under which his land had been acquired contained no explicit 
restrictions on construction.l66 There necessarily followed, he argued, 
a vested private right of use that could not be infringed by a public 
action without compensation.l69 
In upholding the statute, Chief Justice Shaw first noted that any 
rights vested through colonial grants were subject to the general 
right of the public to navigate without impediment.17o He then deter-
mined that the statute's purpose was the free navigation of Massa-
chusetts' coastal waters, a benefit in which Alger and other owners 
of riparian rights had a reciprocating "deep and abiding interest."171 
Suggesting that Alger's buildout of the wharf beyond the statutory 
boundary worked a "noxious use of property," Chief Justice Shaw held 
that while in some cases land use regulations can result in decreased 
profits, compensation for preventing such uses had never been re-
quired at common law.172 
164 See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 53--54 (1851). 
165 See iii. at 54, 98. 
166 See iii. at 62. 
167 See iii. 
166 See iii. at 59. 
169 See Alger, 61 Mass. at 59. 
170 See iii. at 79. 
171 See iii. at 84. 
1"12 See iii. at 86. Although the statute at issue declared any wharf extending beyond the 
Commissioner's line a public nuisance, Chief Justice Shaw admitted that there may have been 
instances prior to the statute where such wharves were not nuisances. See iii. at 103. Alger's 
downfall was particularly inevitable because he chose to build after the statute was in effect. 
See Alger, 61 Mass. at 103. 
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B. Modern Massachusetts Takings Law: Elements of the 
Categorical Takings Rule 
In the early 1960s, the Supreme Judicial Court began to incorporate 
modern United States Supreme Court takings jurisprudence into 
state takings law.173 In so doing, the court often balanced the public 
benefits derived from restrictive land use regulations with the extent 
of economic burdens placed on the owners of regulated parcels.174 
Whether or not a landowner was left with any residual practical use 
of a regulated parcel usually formed the turning point in the court's 
analysis.175 The court commonly studied the content of residual use to 
determine whether a challenged regulation caused such a deprivation 
of value that compensation or invalidation of the regulation was the 
only constitutional remedy.176 
In the 1960 case of Jenckes v. Building Commissioners of Brook-
line, the Supreme Judicial Court established the residual use inquiry 
as a crucial element of its takings analysis.177 In J enckes, a landowner 
was refused a construction permit because of his parcel's non-con-
formity with a zoning by-Iaw.178 The parcel was unbuildable without 
the permit, and the landowner sought a declaration that the by-law 
was therefore inapplicable to his property.179 
Chief Justice Wilkins, in holding for the landowner, explicitly ob-
served that under the existing by-law, the parcel was deprived of any 
use other than perhaps a "playground, a park, or ornamental grounds 
or, perhaps, for uses accessory to the use of the [adjacent] lot ... ," 
and that "[e]ven ordinary agricultural use [did] not seem to be per-
mitted."lBO Therefore Chief Justice Wilkins noted, "[t]he effect of the 
173 See Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 195 N.E.2d 341, 345 (Mass. 1964); Mile Rd. Corp. v. City 
of Boston, 187 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Mass. 1963); see also Jenckes v. Building Comm'rs of Brookline, 
167 N.E.2d 757, 760 (Mass. 1960). 
174 See Aronson, 195 N.E.2d at 345; Mile Rd. Corp., 187 N.E.2d at 829-30; Jenckes, 167 N.E.2d 
at 7594i0. 
176 See Aronson, 195 N.E.2d at 345; Mile Rd. Corp., 187 N.E.2d at 829--S0; Jenckes, 167 N.E.2d 
at 7594i0. 
176 See Aronson, 195 N.E.2d at 345; Mile Rd. Corp., 187 N.E.2d at 829-30; Jenckes, 167 N.E.2d 
at 7594i0. 
177 See Jenckes, 167 N.E.2d at 759. 
178 See id. at 758. 
179 See id. at 758-59. The landowner's lot did not conform to a Brookline zoning by-law that 
required all lots to abut a public or private way of not less than 40 feet. See id. at 757. 
180 See id. at 759; but see Thmpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 899-90 
(Mass. 1972) (agricultural use sufficient residual use to overcome landowner's claim of total 
deprivation). 
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amendment as applied to the locus is to deprive it of all practical value 
to its owner or anyone acquiring it. The owner can merely look at it 
and pay taxes on it."1BI The Chief Justice then assessed the public 
purpose of the bylaw and found that, as applied, it had no substantial 
relation to the public safety, health or welfare.l82 After balancing the 
''harsh'' injury to the claimant with the limited public purposes of the 
by-law, Chief Justice Wilkins held that the by-law was too confisca-
tory as applied to the claimant to be justified under the police power.l83 
The court therefore invalidated the by-law as applied to the plaintiffs 
property.l84 
In 1965 the court decided Mile Road Corp. v. City of Boston and 
Commissioner of National Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., Inc. l86 In 
those cases, Chief Justice Wilkins established a number of inquiries 
for Massachusetts courts to address in reviewing regulatory takings 
claims, including a categorical takings rule that later became the 
controversial basis for the Lucas opinion.l86 In so doing, Chief Justice 
Wilkins incorporated important contemporary Supreme Court deci-
sions into his analysis while assigning careful attention to the issue of 
residual use.lB7 
In Mile Road Corp., Chief Justice Wilkins considered it crucial to 
the takings analysis whether a land owner suffered "complete depri-
vation of property," through regulation.l88 In that case, a 1962 statute 
prohibited the owner of a parcel that was commonly used as a dump-
ing ground from continuing its use as such.l89 The owner alleged that 
181 J enckes, 167 N .E.2d at 759. Chief Justice Wilkins' consideration of ''practical'' value appears 
to be a term of art not derived from previous caselaw. See id. Indeed, he cites no precedent for 
this term, and employs it again in Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., Inc., 
206 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Mass. 1965). 
182 See id. at 760. Chief Justice Wilkins reasoned that the by-law was unreasonably applied to 
the claimant's isolated, undeveloped lot. See id. He noted that the claimant's parcel was sur-
rounded by older, more valuable lots that contained nonconforming single residents. See id. 
Chief Justice Wilkins concluded that allowing another residence would not pose any additional 
hazard to public safety that did not already exist. See Jenckes, 167 N.E.2d at 760. 
183 See id. 
184 See id. 
186 See Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., Inc., 206 N.E.2d 666 (Mass. 1965); 
Bee also Mile Rd. Corp. v. City of Boston, 187 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Mass. 1963). 
188 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 N.E.2d 1003, 1016 (1992); Volpe, 206 
N.E.2d at 670-71. 
187 See Volpe, 667 N.E.2d at 669, 670 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 
592-94 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922); Mile Rd. Corp., 187 N.E.2d at 830). 
188 See Mile Rd. Corp., 187 N.E.2d at 830. 
189 See id. at 828. The statute at issue was St. 1962, c. 583, "An Act Prohibiting the Dumping 
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the statute's enforcement was tantamount to a taking because it 
completely eliminated his "large and substantial investment" in the 
dump. 100 
In ruling that the statute's enforcement did not amount to a taking, 
Chief Justice Wilkins noted that the landowner had no vested prop-
erty right to operate a dump, and that his prior permit to do so was 
expressly revocable at either the health commissioner's request or by 
legislative act.l91 Chief Justice Wilkins then reasoned explicitly that 
the requisite inquiry was not merely whether the statute itself had 
valid public purposes, but rather whether there remained any alter-
native uses for the property.l92 Citing the Supreme Court cases of 
Reinman and Miller, the Chief Justice noted that, because the former 
dump site could be "put to other use[s]," the regulation did not a-
mount to a taking without compensation.l93 
Two years later in Volpe, Chief Justice Wilkins again applied a 
"deprivation of practical use" inquiry in reviewing a landowner's claim 
that certain land use restrictions were the equivalent of a taking 
without compensation.l94 In that case, the Commonwealth had suc-
cessfully enjoined a landowner from filling his wetland property with-
out the requisite permits.195 The trial court had granted the injunction 
on the grounds that the state and local denials of the filling permits 
pursuant to a state law furthered the valid public purpose of protect-
ing marine fisheries. l96 
In reversing the trial court's decision and remanding the case, Chief 
Justice Wilkins offered an analysis consistent with Justice Scalia's 
decision in Lucas twenty-seven years later. Admitting that the public 
purpose of the contested legislation was relevant to the takings in-
quiry, the Chief Justice, citing Goldblatt, stressed that nevertheless 
of Refuse or Trash in a Certain Section of the Dorchester District of the City of Boston." See 
id. 
190 See id. at 829. Chief Justice Wilkins conceded that the statute would put the claimant out 
of business. See id. at 830. 
191 See id. 
192 See Mile Rd. CCff/J., 187 N.E.2d at 829-30 ("The question is not ... whether the record 
affirmatively shows that the legislative restriction bears a substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.") 
193 See id. at 830; see also Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928); Reinman v. Little Rock, 
237 U.S. 171, 176 (1915). 
194 See Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 206 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Mass. 1965}; 
see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). 
195 See Volpe, 206 N.E.2d at 668. The landowner was denied the fill permit due to the Director 
of Marine Fisheries' concern about the ecology in the area. See id. at 668. 
196 See id. 
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the "crucial issue" was whether "there ha[d] been such a deprivation 
of the practical uses of a landowner's property as to be the equivalent 
of a taking without compensation."197 In so reasoning, he referred to 
Pennsylvania Coal as well other state cases that declared unconsti-
tutional certain "confiscatory" land-use restrictions that were other-
wise valid exercises of the police power.19B Moreover, casting doubt on 
the Commonwealth's alleged authority to deny compensation to land-
owners while regulating for the mere purpose of conserving its natu-
ral resources, Chief Justice Wilkins concluded that "[a]n unrecognized 
taking in the guise of regulation is worse than confiscation."l99 
In subsequent cases where landowners contested zoning restric-
tions, the Supreme Judicial Court continued its close attention to 
residual "practical" use as a crucial element in determining the valid-
ity of allegedly confiscatory land-use regulations.2°O Moreover, rather 
than take a more deferential view towards the authority of legislative 
bodies to restrict the use of land merely for environmental preserva-
tion without fear of compensation, the court in some cases also closely 
scrutinized regulations for improper objectives on the part of local 
municipalities.201 
The Mac Gibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury cases, also known 
collectively as the "Mac Gibbon trilogy," illustrate both approaches.202 
In the series of Mac Gibbon cases, the Supreme Judicial Court re-
viewed the Duxbury Zoning Board of Appeals' refusal to allow a 
landowner to excavate and fill a portion of his shoreland.203 The land-
owner alleged that the Board's action was unauthorized under the 
Zoning Enabling Act because its enforcement denied his property of 
197 See id. at 669 (emphasis supplied) (citing Goldblatt v. Thwn of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 
592 (1962); Mile Rd. Corp. v. City of Boston, 189 N.E.2d 826 (Mass 1963). 
198 See id. at 670. In fact, Chief Justice Wilkins agreed to the validity of the regulation, but 
nevertheless ruled that the takings issue would hinge on "further findings as to what uses the 
marshland may still be put." See Volpe, 206 N.E.2d at 671. 
199 See id. For remand, Chief Justice Wilkins requested additional evidence relative to alter-
native uses for the parcel in its natural state, as well as figures pertaining to the original cost 
of the parcel and its market value with and without the limitations. See id. at 671-72. 
200 See, e.g., Lovequist v. Conservation Comm'n ofThwn of Dennis, 393 N.E.2d 858, 866 (Mass. 
1979); 'llirnpike Realty Co. v. Thwn of Dedham, 284 N .E.2d 891, 899-900 (Mass. 1972); MacGib-
bon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 255 N.E.2d 347, 352 (Mass. 1970). 
201 See MacGibbon, 255 N.E.2d at 351. 
202 See MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 200 N.E.2d 254 (Mass. 1964) (MacGibbon 
1); 255 N.E.2d 347 (Mass. 1970) (MacGibbon ll); 340 N.E.2d 487 (Mass. 1976) (MacGibbon Ill); 
Bart J. Gordon, Takings and Related Constitutional Issues in Land Use Cases in REGULATORY 
TAKINGS, supra note 6, at 177. 
203 See MacGibbon II, 255 N.E.2d at 348. 
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any practical use.204 Upon reviewing the case, the Supreme Judicial 
Court disapproved of the Board's zoning policy of prohibiting physical 
changes or improvements on coastal wetlands for the sole purpose of 
"preserv[ing] them in their natural state," and remanded the case 
back to the Board.205 Such a motive, the court declared, was legally 
untenable under the Zoning Enabling Act.206 If a municipality wished 
simply to preserve any remaining undeveloped coastal or inland wet-
lands in their "natural, unspoiled condition for the benefit of the 
public," the court concluded, it must invoke the power of eminent 
domain.207 
The Mac Gibbon case again reached the Supreme Judicial Court in 
1976 when the Duxbury Zoning Board of Appeals again denied the 
landowner's permits by concluding that alternative practical uses for 
the property existed and, furthermore, because the proposed project 
would disturb the role of the coastal marsh in the ocean food chain.208 
This time, the Supreme Judicial Court actually directed the Board to 
grant the permit based on the parcel's limited usefulness without it.209 
The court reasoned that, under Volpe, the Board did not have the 
authority under the zoning by-law to regulate land in such a manner 
as to deprive landowners of all "practical value."210 The Board, con-
cluded the court, had "misconceive[d] the applicable standard" of 
"practical" use by accepting testimony that: 
the uses to which the property may be put include-and some of 
these may sound facetious, but they're not-bird watching, hik-
ing-these are actual uses that people have, do make of such 
properties, similar properties-looking at the water, ... just sim-
ple pride of ownership, just to say that they own a piece of the 
saltmarsh, flying model airplanes or kites, growing marsh hay, 
which at one time was a very strong use of marsh, very prevalent 
204 See id. at 348, 351. The court reviewed whether the denial of the permit was "unreasonable, 
whimsical, capricious or arbitrary" under the Zoning Enabling Act. See id. at 350. 
206 See id. at 351. 
206 See id.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4OA, § 1 et seq. (West 1994). 
207 See MacGibbon II, 255 N.E.2d at 352. The court decided not to review the takings claim, 
and chose to wait until the Board's further action on the plaintiffs special permit application. 
See id. 
208 See MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 340 N.E.2d 487, 489 (Mass. 1976) (MacGib-
bon III). The Appeals Court had found that the plaintiffs marshland could be used for agricul-
tural, recreational and other uses. See id. at 490. The plaintiffs property was worth $5,300 as 
regulated, but had a value of $44,000 with a single residence. See id. 
209 See id. at 488. 
210 See id. at 490 (citing Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 206 N.E.2d 666, 
669 (Mass. 1965); Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 195 N.E.2d 341, 345 (Mass. 1964». 
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use I should say, to protect the view, to provide a view .... Of 
course, one, obviously, is conservation .... 211 
The case upon which the Board relied in the Mac Gibbon dispute 
was the 1972 decision, also cited by the dissent in Lucas, of Turnpike 
Realty Company v. Town of Dedham.212 In that case, the Supreme 
Judicial Court reviewed a landowner's as-applied challenge to a zoning 
by-law that included his property in a zoning flood plain.213 The land-
owner alleged that the by-law, which restricted all uses in the flood-
plain except for "[a]ny woodland, grassland, wetland, agricultural, 
horticultural, or recreational use of land or water not requiring 
filling," was unreasonably and unduly burdensome and therefore un-
constitutional as applied to his land.214 
In upholding the by-law, Justice Spiegel first undertook careful 
scrutiny of its purposes by affording every presumption in favor of 
its validity, and preparing to defer to the judgment of local authorities 
if its reasonableness was fairly debatable.215 Reasoning that the by-
law was enacted to protect nearby residents from any exacerbation 
of existing flood conditions, he concluded that the town had not arbi-
trarily and unreasonably exercised the police power.216 Justice Spiegel 
211 See MacGibbon III, 340 N.E.2d at 491 (quoting the testimony of an expert witness for the 
Board). The court did not rule again on MacGibbon's suit, but the MacGibbon case actually 
reached the Supreme Judicial Court for the fourth time on a petition for rehearing in 1976. See 
MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 344 N.E.2d 185, 186 (Mass. 1976). The Board's main 
concern on rehearing was the possible impact of the MacGibbon decisions on the enforcement 
of a variety of state and federal conservation programs, such as the regulation of scenic and 
recreational rivers, acquisition of land by counties to preserve open space, and protection of 
coastal wetlands. See id. at 186 n.2. The Board also feared that the MacGibbon decisions 
questioned the legality and wisdom of certain statutes that governed the protection of coastal 
and inland wetlands. See id. at 187. In denying the rehearing, Justice Braucher refused to 
consider these arguments because they were neither discussed nor decided in the earlier cases. 
See id. 
212 See Thrnpike Realty Company v. 'Thwn of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972); see also 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1044 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
MacGibbon III, 340 N.E.2d at 491 (distinguishing Thrnpike Realty Co. v. 'Thwn of Dedham, 284 
N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972». 
213 See Turnpike Realty, 284 N.E.2d at 894. The by-law, which went into effect sixteen years 
after the claimant purchased the parcel, prohibited the construction or use of any structure or 
building except for certain designated purposes. See id. at 894. The by-law also contained 
avenues for special permits which the petitioner had not pursued. See id. 
214 See id. at 894, 897-98. Testimony revealed that, prior to the enactment of the by-law, the 
best use of petitioner's land was for apartment buildings at a value of $431,000, and after the 
enactment the best use was for agriculture at a value of $53,000. See id. at 900. The by-law thus 
worked an 88% devaluation of the petitioner's property. See Turnpike Realty, 284 N.E.2d at 900. 
215 See id. at 898-99. 
216 See id. at 896, 898, 899, 901 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,395 (1926». 
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then discredited the petitioner's claim that the by-law deprived him 
of "all beneficial uses of his property.''217 Although the uses allowed un-
der the by-law may have "substantially restrict[ed]" the petitioner's 
use of his land, Justice Spiegel concluded that they were sufficient 
enough when balanced against the potential harm of flooding to the 
community.218 
Although concurring, Chief Justice Tauro stressed that the major-
ity's discussion of "diminution in value" should not be construed as a 
critical meaning of Turnpike Realty, lest the decision be used "with-
out justification" for "administrative denials of future petitions for 
building permits."219 Chief Justice Tauro interpreted the majority's 
ruling as establishing simply that the plaintiff's property did not 
suffer such a diminution in value as to render the by-law unconstitu-
tional.220 Whether the petitioner was in fact an "uncompensated victim 
... of a taking invalid [sic] without compensation" per Volpe, the Chief 
Justice cautioned, could only be decided upon the Board's denial of 
construction permits.221 
In Lovequist v. Conservation Commission of Town of Dennis, the 
Supreme Judicial Court continued to examine residual uses in assess-
ing the validity of zoning laws and takings claims.222 In Lovequist, a 
developer challenged the Dennis Conservation Commission's denial of 
a permit to construct an access road across his cranberry bog and 
marshland as a regulatory taking.223 The developer had requested to 
improve an existing accessway for reaching a proposed subdivision at 
the upland portion of his property.224 
Judge Spiegel recognized that the by-law helped prevent the harmful effects of flooding. See id. 
at 899. He referred to expert testimony concluding that petitioner's project "could cause the 
water to rise higher at other points." See id. at n.5. 
217 See Turnpike Realty, 284 N.E.2d at 899. 
218 See id. at 899-900. 
219 See id. at 901-00 (Tauro, C.J., concurring). 
220 See id. at 901 (Tauro, C.J., concurring). 
221 See id. (Tauro, C.J., concurring) (citing Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & 
Co., 206 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Mass. 1965); MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 255 N.E.2d 
347, 352 (Mass. 1970) (MacGibban II)). 
222 See Lovequist v. Conservation Comm'n of the Town of Dennis, 393 N.E.2d 858, 866 (Mass. 
1979). 
223 See id. at 861. The plaintiff had also alleged that the by-law was inconsistent with the Mass. 
Zoning Enabling Act, that the Dennis Conservation Commission was biased, and that the 
Commission lacked substantial evidence to justify disapproval of the proposed access road. See 
id; see also MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 1 (West 1994). 
224 See Lovequist, 393 N.E.2d at 860. The developer wished to subdivide 26 of the 40 acres of 
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In denying the plaintiff's claim, Chief Justice Hennessey cited Al-
gers holding that property in Massachusetts is subject to reasonable 
restraints and regulation in the public interest.226 Referring to Penn 
Central, Chief Justice Hennessey posited that regulations can deprive 
landowner of even the "most beneficial" use of property without ef-
fecting a taking.226 Nevertheless, following Mac Gibbon, he agreed that 
government actions that strip private property owners "of all practi-
cal value to them or to anyone acquiring it, leaving them only with 
the burden of paying taxes on it" may be "forbidden takings."227 Chief 
Justice Hennessey then identified several alternative uses for the 
plaintiff's property, such as a single family house, a camp, or commer-
cial cranberry production.228 These alternatives, including the prop-
erty's current appraisal of $122,000, led him to conclude that the 
Commission's denial of the construction permit did not constitute an 
unlawful taking.229 
By 1980, the Massachusetts courts were interpreting both MacGib-
bon and Turnpike Realty as important cases for regulatory takings 
claims and for challenges to allegedly confiscatory zoning laws.230 
Even when faced with substantially diminished property values, 
courts sometimes denied takings claims by citing Turnpike Realty to 
woodland, marshland, and cranberry bog. See id. Under the Wetlands Protection Act and a 
Dennis by-law, the developer needed pennits to construct on wetlands. See id. at 860--61 n.3--4. 
225 See id. at 866; Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 59 (1851). Chief Justice Hennessey 
agreed with the Commission's finding that the plaintiff's proposed construction might disturb 
the town's water supply. See Lovequist, 393 N.E.2d at 865. He cited Turnpike Realty'S holding 
that the protection of groundwater is a valid public interest. See id. (citing Thrnpike Realty Co. 
v. 'lbwn of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972». 
226 See id. at 866 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978». 
227 See id. (citing MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 340 N.E.2d 487, 490 (Mass. 1976) 
(MacGibbon llI). 
228 See id. The Commission had expressly indicated its willingness to consider proposals 
relating to the upgrading of the existing access road in order to assist the development of these 
uses. See Loveladies, 393 N.E.2d at 886, n.13. 
228 See id. at 866 (citing Turnpike Realty, 362 Mass. at 236). 
230 See MacNeil v. 'lbwn of Avon, 435 N.E.2d 1043, 1046 (Mass. 1982) (citing Turnpike Realty 
to support upholding a by-law where the value of regulated land is substantially diminished); 
Lovequi8t, 393 N.E.2d at 866 (under Turnpike Realty, the denial of a road construction pennit 
not a taking merely because of resulting decrease in profits); S. Kemble Fischer Realty Trust 
v. Board of Appeals of Concord, 402 N.E.2d 100, 103 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (Turnpike Realty 
"forec1ose[d] the argument that the exceedingly limited use which a flood plain zoning by-law 
may leave to the owner of land constitutes a de facto taking."); Thrner v. 'lbwn of Walpole, 409 
N.E.2d 807, 808 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (the allegation that that a flood control regulation was 
confiscatory "controlled by Turnpike Realty". 
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identify practical residual uses of regulated land.231 Turnpike Realty 
was particularly valuable for bolstering decisions upholding land use 
restrictions in flood plains.232 For example, in S. Kemble Fisher Realty 
Trust v. Board of Appeals of Concord, a landowner appealed to the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court the denial of a permit to fill the portion 
of his land that was located in a floodplain district.233 The landowner 
asserted, in part, that the flood plain zoning was unconstitutional as 
applied because it left him "without any practical use" of a thirty-foot 
strip of his property.2M The Appeals Court, in denying the landowner's 
claim, read Turnpike Realty to require that flood plain use restrictions 
must, in the context of takings claims, "be balanced against the po-
tential harm to the community."236 The court concluded that the plain-
tiff's proposed filling project ultimately might inflict considerable 
flood damage to the surrounding area.236 The court further found that 
the plaintiff maintained sufficient value in the regulated portion of his 
property because it could be used to "enhance that portion of [his] 
land which is outside the flood plain.''237 
One of the last important pre-Lucas Massachusetts regulatory tak-
ings cases was the 1988 decision of Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. 
Secretary of the Commonwealth.233 It was an appropriate moment for 
the case, as the Yankee decision and its dissent well reflected the 
discord that colored United States Supreme Court's regulatory tak-
ings debates before Lucas. In that case, Yankee Atomic challenged 
the Attorney General's certification of an initiative petition that, once 
passed, would have prohibited the generation of electricity by nuclear 
power plants in Massachusetts.239 Yankee Atomic alleged that the 
petition, if enacted, would constitute a taking of its property, and was 
therefore unconstitutional and void.240 
231 See MacNeil 435 N.E.2d at 1046; Lovequist, 393 N.E.2d at 858, 866; S. Kemble Fischer, 402 
N.E.2d at 103; Turner, 409 N.E.2d at 808. 
232 See S. Kemble Fischer, 402 N.E.2d at 103; Turner, 409 N.E.2d at 808. 
233 See S. Kemble Fischer, 402 N.E.2d at 101. 
234 See id. at 103. In the lower court, the judge had found that the plaintiff could not use the 
land "for access, general recreation or other uses pennitted within the Flood Plain Conservancy 
District," although the judge also found that the land was not ''worthless.'' See id. 
235 See id. 
236 See id. 
237 See S. Kemble Fischer, 402 N.E.2d at 103. 
238 See Yankee Atomic, 526 N.E.2d 1246 (Mass. 1988). 
239 See id. at 1247. Yankee Atomic sought to prevent the Secretary of State from including 
the initiative on the ballot in the upcoming state election. See id. 
240 See id. The plaintiffs referred to Article 48 of the Massachusetts Constitution, which 
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In refusing to recognize a taking, the Supreme Judicial Court, citing 
Penn Central and Turnpike Realty, undertook a "peculiarly fact de-
pendent" analysis involving "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.''241 
In so doing, the court considered relevant both "residual use"242 and 
a "determination of the diminution in value of the regulated prop-
erty."243 This analysis led the majority to conclude that the petition, if 
enacted, would not constitute a taking of Yankee Atomic's property 
because nothing in the petition restricted alternative uses of the 
land.244 The majority further considered Yankee Atomic's argument, 
which focused on the petition's impact on the value of its nuclear 
reactor rather than on its property as a whole, to be inconsistent with 
Keystone's language regarding the parceling of property interests.246 
Citing Pennsylvania Coal, MacGibbon and Volpe, the Yankee dis-
sent considered the petition, once enacted, to effect a taking of Yankee 
Atomic's property because of its "catastrophic" economic impact.246 
Arguing that Pennsylvania Coal espoused the "bedrock principles of 
regulatory takings law," Justice Lynch, joined by Justice Liacos, un-
derstood Pennsylvania Coal and its progeny to have established 
three significant factors in the regulatory takings analysis:247 "(1) 
[T]he economic impact of the regulation, (2) its interference with 
reasonable investment-based expectations, and (3) the character of 
the government action.''248 In examining each of these factors, the 
dissent noted first that the enacted petition would render Yankee 
excludes referendums that are inconsistent with an individual's "right to receive compensation 
for private property appropriated to public use .... " See MAss. CONST. Art. 48, The Initiative, 
II, § 3. 
241 See Yankee, 526 N.E.2d at 1249 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 
104, 124 (1978». 
242 See id. at 1250 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131; MacNeil v.1bwn of Avon, 435 N.E.2d 
1043,1045 (Mass. 1982); Lovequist v. Conservation Comm'n of the 1bwn of Dennis, 393 N.E.2d 
858, 866 (Mass. 1979». 
248 See id. (citing Goldblatt v. 1bwn of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); Hadacheck v. 
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915); 'furnpike Realty Co. v. 1bwn of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 
900 (Mass. 1972». 
244 See id. at 1250 n.7. The majority's opinion affirmed an opinion of the Attorney General 
holding likewise. See id. The Attorney General had approved the petition's certification. See 
Yankee,526 N.E.2d at 1250, n.7. 
245 See id. at n.8. 
248 See id. at 1253 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
247 See id. at 1251 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
248 See id. at 1252 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedic-
tis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Corp., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979»; see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
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Atomic's only reason for being in business "commercially impractica-
ble."249 Yankee Atomic's parcel, argued Justice Lynch, was "irre-
versibly committed to a nuclear facility," as "much of the plant equip-
ment [would] be made radioactive and because the site itself [would] 
become (de-facto) a long-term radioactive waste storage facility 
.... "250 All of Yankee Atomic's investment-backed expectations, 
therefore, would be clearly eliminated by the proposed legislation.251 
Citing MacGibbon, the dissent concluded that "this [was] a classic 
case of a regulation leaving a landowner with only the burdens of 
ownership and none of the benefits."252 
Citing Mugler, Hadacheck, and Goldblatt, the dissent then scruti-
nized the nature of the petition for its conformance with the state's 
police power to regulate the "noxious use of property" in the interest 
of public health and safety.253 Regulations enacted for such purposes, 
argued Justice Lynch, are distinguished from state actions which 
serve only private interests.254 Justice Lynch noted that in this case, 
the petition was offered not for public health and safety purposes, but 
rather because it was: 
uneconomical and unwise to continue to generate electric power 
in the Commonwealth by means which result in the production of 
nuclear waste when there is no method for disposal of nuclear 
waste. The purpose of this Act is to protect the people of Massa-
chusetts from the consequences of this uneconomical and unwise 
course .... Thus, by its own terms, the petition seeks not to abate 
any public nuisance, but only to shelter the public from what its 
249 See Yankee, 526 N.E.2d at 1253 (Lynch, J., dissenting). Lynch thereby distinguished Yan-
kee Atomic' case from the miners' situation in Keystone, where the challenged regulation did 
not render the mining of coal "commercially impracticable." See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting) (citing 
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 484). 
250 See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting) (citing Attorney General's certification of the initiative 
petition). 
251 See id. at 1254 (Lynch, J., dissenting). Yankee had expected, based on its federal license, 
to operate its nuclear power plant until 1997. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). The dissent further 
argued that Yankee would be forced by federal law to shoulder the burden of commissioning 
the plant upon cessation of nuclear power production. See Yankee, 526 N.E.2d at 1253 (Lynch, 
J., dissenting). 
252 See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting) (citing MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 255 
N.E.2d 347 (Mass. 1970) (MacGibbon lI). 
253 See id. at 1254 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 
592 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 412 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 628 U.S. 623, 
668-69 (1887». 
264 See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting) (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 
U.S. 470, 492 (1987». 
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signers see as an economically unwise method of producing elec-
tricity.255 
Justice Lynch therefore concluded that the nature of the petition 
did not conform to the public purpose goals which the Supreme Court 
had considered as forming exceptions to the Takings Clause. 
C. The "Denominator" Issue in Massachusetts 
Yankee also addressed, although briefly, the "denominator" ques-
tion which also surfaced in Penn Central and Keystone.256 The major-
ity in Yankee asserted that Yankee Atomic's takings argument im-
properly focused on the petition's destructive economic impact on the 
nuclear reactor rather than on the property as a whole.257 The dissent, 
on the other hand, referred to Article Ten of the Massachusetts Dec-
laration of Rights, which states that "no part of the property of any 
individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to public 
uses, without his consent, or that of the representative body of the 
people .... "258 The dissent posited that, although Keystone's interpre-
tation of the Fifth Amendment disapproved the "segmenting" of pro-
perty for the purposes of a takings claim, it did not necessarily pre-
empt the additional protections afforded by the language of Article 
10.259 
Despite the conflicting opinions in Yankee regarding the segment-
ing issues addressed by Keystone and Penn Central, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court has consistently followed Keystone and 
Penn Central when addressing the "denominator" question.260 For 
example, in Flynn v. City of Cambridge, landlords contested the 
authority of the Cambridge City Council to regulate evictions from 
rent control apartments and the conversions of housing subject to 
rent contro1.261 They argued that the ordinance amounted to a taking 
of their units by restricting the uses for which they could be utilized.262 
256 See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
256 See Yankee, 526 N.E.2d at 1250 n.8. 
257 See id. 
258 See id. at 1253-54 n.2 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original) (quoting MASS. 
CONST. Art. X). 
259 See id. at 1253 n.2. 
260 See Fragopoulos v. Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge, 557 N.E.2d 1153, 1157 (Mass. 1990); 
Moskow v. Commissioner of Dep't of Envtl. Management, 427 N.E.2d 750, 753 (Mass. 1981); 
Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 418 N.E.2d 335, 339 (Mass. 1981). 
261 See Flynn, 418 N.E.2d at 33~6. 
262 See id. at 336. In response to a serious housing shortage, the ordinance required that any 
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Citing Penn Central, the Flynn majority held that the court's focus 
in a takings case should be on both the character of the government's 
action, and on the nature and extent of that action's interference with 
rights in the parcel as a whole.263 The majority then concluded that, 
since the expectations of owners using their units for rental housing 
on the effective date of the ordinance were not frustrated by its 
restrictions, the Flynn ordinance did not interfere with the land-
owners' "primary expectations" concerning the use of their prop-
erty.264 The court further held that while use restrictions may "unde-
niably diminish the value of the property, this alone does not establish 
a taking."265 
Similarly, in Moskow v. Commissioner of Department of Environ-
mental Management, the Supreme Judicial Court denied the takings 
challenge of an owner of a parcel consisting of fifty-five percent inland 
wetlands.266 In that case, the Department of Environmental Manage-
ment's order pursuant to the Inlands Wetlands Act barred the plain-
tiff from dredging, filling, or altering this wetland area.267 The Supe-
rior Court held that the Act's effect on the wetland portion of the 
plaintiff's property amounted to a taking because "the owner [was] 
denied the use of more than half his parcel" without "reciprocal 
benefit."268 However, upon direct appellate review, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court reversed by noting that in Penn Central, the Court had 
focused both on "the character of the action and on the nature and 
extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole .... "269 
D. Nuisance Controls Immune to Takings Claims 
The Supreme Judicial Court has thwarted takings claims in cases 
where the regulation of nuisances worked to deny landowners all use 
rent control unit remain, as of August 10, 1979, part of the Cambridge rental housing stock 
unless the city rent control board issued a permit deeming otherwise. See id. at 337. The 
plaintiffs claimed that the ordinance amounted to a taking of their property since, in some 
circumstances, an owner of a condominium would be prohibited from occupying his or her unit. 
See id. 
263 See id. 339 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130--31 (1978». 
264 See Flynn, 418 N.E.2d at 339--40. 
265 See id. 
266 See Moskow v. Commissioner of Dep't of Envtl. Management, 427 N.E.2d 750, 751 (Mass. 
1981). 
267 See id. at 752. 
268 See id. 
269 See id. at 753 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130--31 (1978) 
(emphasis supplied». 
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of their land.270 For example, in Nassr v. Commonwealth, landowners 
claimed that state officials had effected a taking of their property 
when it was seized for the purpose of removing hazardous waste.271 
Plaintiffs alleged that the Commonwealth's eighteen month cleanup 
operation constituted a temporary taking for which they were enti-
tled to payments equal to the property's reasonable rental value 
during the cleanup period.272 
Upon applying Penn Central's two-part test, the Supreme Judicial 
Court concluded that the Commonwealth's clean-up efforts "main-
tain[ed] the public health" and "prevent[ed] the risks of groundwater 
contamination, fires and explosions, and life threatening disease."273 
As such, they were "classic exercises of the police power" that could 
not be transformed into an exercise of eminent domain.274 The court 
also noted that that the Commonwealth had statutory authority to 
undertake cleanup procedures upon the spillage or seepage of any 
contaminants that could result in "damage to the waters, shores or 
natural resources utilized or enjoyed by [its] citizens .... "275 Noting 
as well that the lower court judge had declared the plaintiffs' storage 
and disposal of contaminated waste a "public nuisance,"276 the Nassr 
court summarily dismissed the plaintiffs' compensation claims by con-
cluding that they "sound[ ed] a particularly hollow ring in light of the 
[Superior Court] judge's findings that both the warehouse and the 
liquid lagoon presented serious health risks .... "277 
270 See Nassr v. Commonwealth, 477 N.E.2d 987, 991 (Mass. 1985); see also Davidson v. 
Commonwealth, 395 N.E.2d 1314, 1318 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (Penn Central two-part test cited 
to uphold Commonwealth's takeover of a nursing home as a lawful exercise of the police power 
not amounting to a taking). 
271 See Nassr, 477 N.E.2d at 990. Occupants of the property had negligently stored and 
dumped certain flammable and carcinogenic chemicals on the premises that created risk of 
damage to the central nervous system, liver, and kidneys if ingested through the groundwater 
supply. See id. at 989. Upon discovery of this condition, state and local officials locked the 
premises and maintained a security guard during cleanup operations. See id. at 990. 
272 See id. 
273 See id. 
274 See id. at 990-91. The majority also quoted Miller: "[W]here the public interest is involved 
preferment of that interest over the property interest of the individual, to the extent even of 
its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of the police power 
which affects property." See Nassr, 977 N.E.2d at 991 (quoting Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 
279--80 (1928)). 
275 See id. at 990 n.2 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21, § 27 (West 1994)). 
276 See id. at 990. 
277 See id. at 991. 
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E. Lopes v. City of Peabody 
In March of 1994, the Supreme Judicial Court decided Lopes v. City 
of Peabody, one of the first state court cases interpreting Lucas.278 
Lopes commenced in 1989 when a landowner asserted in the Massa-
chusetts Land Court that a wetlands conservancy zoning district was 
invalid as applied to a large portion of his parce1.279 The ordinance 
forbade construction within thirty feet of a nearby pond and in areas 
below an elevation of eighty-eight and one-half feet above sea level.280 
The elevation of all but a small portion of Lopes' lot was below this 
level, and he allegedly was "unable to use his land as a result" of the 
ordinance.281 The Land Court nevertheless ruled that the city's estab-
lishment of the conservancy district and the minimum permitted ele-
vation was a "valid exercise of legislative discretion" and that there-
fore no taking had occurred.282 
On appeal, the Massachusetts Appeals Court, although agreeing 
that Lopes had "no practical or beneficial use of his land," affirmed 
the Land Court's decision.2&'l The court found it sufficient that the 
ordinance was rationally related to conservation objectives and the 
prevention of flood damage to nearby homes.284 The court also consid-
ered it significant that Lopes had purchased his property in "full 
knowledge" of the ordinance.285 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court then refused further 
appellate review in September of 1992, but the United States Su-
278 See Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312 (Mass. 1994); see also Ausness, supra note 
7, at 390. For other Massachusetts cases citing Lucas, see also Daddario v. Cape Cod Comm'n, 
681 N.E.2d 833, 837 (Mass. 1997); Leonard v. Town of Brimfield, 666 N.E.2d 1300, 1303 (Mass. 
1996); Greenfield County Estates Tenants Ass'n, Inc. v. Deep, 666 N.E.2d 988, 992 (Mass. 1996); 
Goulding v. Cook, 661 N.E.2d 1322, 1324 (Mass. 1996); Steinbergh v. City of Cambridge, 604 
N.E.2d 1269, 1273 (Mass. 1992); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 597 N.E.2d 43, 46 (Mass. 1992); 
Municipal Light Co. of Ashburnham v. Commonwealth, 608 N.E.2d 743, 748-49 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1992). 
279 See Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312, 1313 (Mass. 1994). Lopes acquired the lot, 
along with three other noncontiguous parcels, six years after the City of Peabody adopted the 
ordinance. See id. 
280 See id. at 1313 n.3. 
281 See id. at 1314. The parties had stipulated to this assertion. See id. 
282 See Lopes, 629 N.E.2d at 1314. 
283 See id. The Lopes Appeals Court decision is unpublished. See id. (citing 32 Mass.App.Ct. 
1124,595 N.E.2d 812 (1992)). 
284 See id. 
285 See id. The Appeals Court stated that Lopes thus could "hardly claim inverse condemna-
tion." See Lopes, 629 N.E.2d at 1314. 
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preme Court later allowed Lopes' petition for certiorari.286 The Su-
preme Court subsequently vacated the Land Court's judgment, and 
remanded the case back to the Massachusetts Appeals Court for 
further consideration in light of Lucas.287 The Supreme Judicial Court 
then granted Lopes' request for direct review.288 
Writing for the majority, Justice Wilkins applied an interpretation 
of Lucas to determine whether the ordinance was constitutionally 
permissible as applied to Lopes' parcel.289 Under Lucas, stated Justice 
Wilkins, if the ordinance deprived Lopes of "all economically beneficial 
use and no justification exist[ed] for that restriction," the ordinance 
should be invalidated to "the extent necessary ... to permit economi-
cally beneficial use of the land.''290 In other words, in order to be con-
stitutional under Lucas, a challenged ordinance must "substantially 
advance state interests" while not "prohibit[ing] in advance any use 
of the land that state law would bar in any event."291 If, however, the 
ordinance did not deny Lopes' property of all economically beneficial 
use, Justice Wilkins posited that pre-Lucas takings principles would 
apply.292 In any event, he concluded that: 
The Lucas opinion appears to have changed, or at least re-
focused, the applicable standards for determining whether . . . 
there has been a regulatory taking of property. An essential fact 
question is whether application of the ordinance has caused the 
Lopes land to have no economically beneficial use ... a tenn that 
the Supreme Court has not yet defined.293 
Justice Wilkins then suggested that, on remand, the Land Court 
could either first examine whether the challenged ordinance did not 
substantially advance legitimate state interests as applied to Lopes' 
286 See id. 
287 See id. at 1313 n.2. 
288 See id. In his petition to the Supreme Court, Lopes had focused on the takings question, 
and specifically whether the Fifth Amendment entitled him to compensation when an ordinance 
left his land "valueless and without any beneficial use." See id. at 1314 n.6. However, on remand, 
the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed only whether the ordinance was valid as applied to Lopes, 
and left for a separate lawsuit the actual takings claim. See Lopes, 629 N.E.2d at n.7. 
289 See id. at 1315. Justice Wllkins first resolved that the Appeals Court had improperly denied 
Lopes the opportunity to challenge the ordinance merely because it was in effect at the time of 
purchase. See id. at 1314-15. 
290 See id. In so stating, Justice Wilkins acknowledged Peabody's interest in enforcing the 
ordinance "to the extent that it [was] constitutionally permissible to do so." See id. 
291 See Lopes, 629 N.E.2d at 1315 (citing Agins v. TIburon, 447 U.S. 254, 260 (1980); Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978». 
292 See id. 
293 See id. 
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lot.294 Such an examination, the court concluded, should be made on a 
"case by case basis as to the particular land involved" without assign-
ing any weight to "political judgments concerning the desirability" of 
the ordinance.296 Or, offered Justice Wilkins, the Land Court could first 
decide whether the ordinance deprived Lopes' land of all economically 
beneficial use and did not prohibit the use of his land that state law 
would have barred to begin with: "In other words, Lopes would have 
to show that his land, free of the regulation, has some economically 
beneficial use and that it has none when subject to the zoning regu-
lation.''296 
On remand, the Land Court allowed Lopes to amend his complaint 
to allege that a regulatory taking of his property entitled him to com-
pensation under Article 10 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massa-
chusetts Constitution.297 In his decision, Judge Cauchon first exam-
ined whether the Peabody ordinance deprived Lopes of all beneficial 
use.298 Concluding that Lopes' property had been deprived of "most, 
if not all economically beneficial use," Judge Cauchon invoked the 
Florida Rock and Loveladies balancing tests to measure "whether or 
not the government ha[d] acted in a responsible way" when it de-
prived Lopes a "substantial part of the economic use or value of 
property" through regulation.299 Even when the government seeks by 
regulation to advance public interests, noted Judge Cauchon, a com-
pensable taking may still occur where: 
The result is a denial of economically viable use of property ... 
[and] the property owners had distinct investment backed expec-
tations and the interest taken was one vested in the owners as a 
294 See id. at 1316 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); 
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260». 
2!l6 See id. at 1316. Justice Wilkins suggested that Lopes might prove that a lower contour 
could serve the same legitimate state interests. See Lopes, 629 N.E.2d at 1316. 
296 See id. Justice Wilkins refused, however, to examine the specific application of Massachu-
setts nuisance law to Lopes' case. See id. at 1316-17. 
29'1 See Lopes v. City of Peabody, 3 Ld.Ct.Rptr. 78, 79 (1995) 
298 See id. 
299 See id. at 80 (citing Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 
1994». Judge Cauchon noted that the value of the parcel did not have to be "zero" for the 
regulation to constitute a compensable taking. See id. at 79. The Florida Rock "partial taking" 
test, discussed supra, note 140 and accompanying text, entailed examining whether the govern-
ment "limit[ed] constraints on property ownership to things necessary to achieve public pur-
pose," while ensuring that the regulation "has not allocated to some number of individuals, less 
than all, burdens that should be born by all." See id.; Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1571. 
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matter of state property law and not within the power of the state 
to regulate under common-law nuisance doctrine.3OO 
Judge Cauchon then examined the validity of the eighty-eight and 
one-half foot elevation requirement, and determined that, as applied 
to Lopes' property, the elevation served no legitimate state interest 
while unnecessarily burdening Lopes' land.30l Judge Cauchon then 
ordered that, as to Lopes' property, the conservancy district was to 
be amended to an elevation of slightly over eighty-six feet in order to 
"permit an economically beneficial use" of his property.302 He con-
cluded by suggesting that, although Lopes could not make a claim for 
a permanent physical taking, he might have a temporary taking claim 
under First English.303 
IV. FILLING IN THE GAPS: WHAT LUCAS MEANS FOR 
MASSACHUSETTS 
A. Lucas' Open Questions for State Courts 
The impact of Lucas on future regulatory takings law in Massachu-
setts is difficult to predict, as the decision arguably suggests much 
more than it legally pronounces.304 For several reasons, state courts 
are subsequently left with some leeway in filling the gaps left by 
Justice Scalia's analysis, especially in determining the breadth of the 
nuisance exception and the meaning of the denial of all economically 
beneficial use of land.305 First, Justice Scalia assumed as fact the 
so-called "fiction" that Lucas' property was left with no economic 
use.306 He could therefore avoid providing state courts with any guid-
ance as to the types of remaining uses that may be sufficient to 
refute a claim of total deprivation.307 Another related issue is the 
BOO See Lopes, 3 Ld.Ct.Rptr. at 80 (citing Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 
1171,1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994». 
801 See id. at 80-81. Judge Cauchon noted that the trial judge had determined that the 88.5 
foot contour requirement "seem[ed] to be a peculiarly political decision." See id. at 81. 
802 See id. at 81. 
808 See id. (citing First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304 (1987». 
304 See Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1413 
(1993); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1438 (1993). 
806 See Ausness, supra note 7, at 466; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1015 (1992). 
806 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020 n.9; Lazarus, supra note 304, at 1431. 
807 See Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312, 1315 (Mass. 1994) ("no economically 
beneficial use [is] a term that the Supreme Court has not yet defined .... "). 
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partial takings question that Justice Scalia acknowledged but left 
unanswered: Is the Lucas categorical rule inapplicable to those land-
owners who allege a taking of only a large portion but not all of the 
use of their property?308 A third unanswered issue concerns the "de-
nominator" in a court's devaluation analysis: in a diminution calcula-
tion, should courts focus on the regulated segment as the relevant 
parcel, or should they examine the property as a whole?309 Finally, of 
what consequence is Lucas' "nuisance exception" to Massachusetts' 
takings analysis?310 Will it narrow the breadth of police power de-
fenses to takings claims?311 Or might it allow the uncompensated, total 
diminution of property values so long as regulators adhere to some 
undefined standards of background nuisance law?312 
Massachusetts' rich regulatory takings jurisprudence has histori-
cally tracked developments in Supreme Court regulatory takings law, 
and thus can illustrate how state courts might consider the questions 
left open by Lucas and its precedent. The following section will dem-
onstrate how Lucas should not shift the course of Massachusetts 
takings law, and moreover how Massachusetts courts have addressed 
some of Lucas' unanswered questions. 
B. The Categorical Rule in Massachusetts 
Lucas' pronouncement that a zoning law will be unconstitutional 
if it "does not substantially advance state interests or denies an owner 
economically viable use of his land" has been a consistent tenet of 
Massachusetts regulatory takings law since 1965.313 The Supreme 
308 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1064 (Stevens,J., dissenting); Epstein, supra note 135, at 1369 (1993). 
309 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17 n.7; but see Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedic-
tis, 480 U.S. 470, 498 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978). 
Although Scalia revisited the denominator issue in Lucas, Supreme Court and Federal Circuit 
precedent had arguably established that the whole parcel is relevant to the regulatory takings 
diminution analysis. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 498; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130; Sugameli, 
supra note 110, at 478. 
310 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020--32. 
311 See Ausness, supra note 7, at 406-4l7. 
312 See Sax, supra note 304, at 1438. States may now have broader authority under the 
nuisance exception to determine the extent to which existing legal principles limit property 
rights. See id. 
313 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); MacNeil v. Town 
of Avon, 435 N.E.2d 1043, 1045 (Mass. 1982); MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 255 
N.E.2d 347, 352 (Mass. 1970) (MacGibbon 11); Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe 
& Co., 206 N.E.2d 660, 670 (Mass. 1965); see also Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 526 N.E.2d 1246, 1251-55 (Mass. 1988) (Lynch, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
Holmes' pronouncement in Pennsylvania Coal that, if regulation "reaches a certain magnitude, 
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Judicial Court's application of this rule is most articulately illustrated 
by the Volpe and MacGibbon decisions, in addition to the Yankee 
dissent.314 In Volpe, the majority recognized that the relevant takings 
inquiry is not merely whether the regulation furthers a proper public 
purpose, but also whether "there has been such a deprivation of the 
practical uses of a landowner's property as to be the equivalent of a 
taking without compensation."316 Similarly, in the MacGibbon cases, 
the court implied that a restrictive zoning regulation might be tanta-
mount to a taking if it "deprives the plaintiff's land of all practical 
value to them or to anyone acquiring it, leaving them only with the 
burden of paying taxes on it."316 Perhaps the Supreme Judicial Court's 
most explicit pronouncements regarding what would later be termed 
the "Lucas categorical rule" emerged in the dissent's opinion in Yan-
kee.317 The Yankee dissent recognized as a ''bedrock principle[]" of 
regulatory takings law Justice Holmes' pronouncement in Pennsyl-
vania Coal that a regulation will require an exercise in eminent 
domain when deprivation reaches a certain magnitude.31s 
The Massachusetts courts are therefore not new to the categorical 
rule for determining the validity of land use ordinances and the merits 
of regulatory takings claims.319 Thus, even in cases where landowners 
allege complete deprivation, the introduction of Lucas' categorical 
rule should not cause a noticeable shift in Massachusetts regulatory 
takings laW.320 However, although the Supreme Judicial Court has 
reviewed land use restrictions with close attention to their confisca-
tory effects,321 in reality Massachusetts courts have not been overly 
in most if not all cases there must be an exercise in eminent domain and compensation" set the 
"bedrock principles of regulatory takings law"). 
814 See MacGibbon 11, 255 N.E.2d at 352; Volpe, 206 N.E.2d at 670; see also Yankee, 526 N.E.2d 
at 1251-55 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
816 See Volpe, 206 N.E.2d at 669 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-93 
(1962); Mile Rd. Corp. v. City of Boston, 187 N .E.2d 826, 830 (Mass. 1963». 
816 See MacGibbon 11, 255 N.E.2d at 352 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 
415-416 (1922); Jenckes v. Building Comm'rs of Brookline, 167 N.E.2d 757, 760 (Mass. 1960». 
817 See Yankee, 526 N.E.2d at 1251-54 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
318 See id. at 1251-52 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (citing Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393, 415 
(1922». 
819 See MacGibbon 11, 255 N.E.2d at 352; Volpe, 206 N.E.2d at 671; see also Yankee, 526 N.E.2d 
at 1251-55 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
820 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). 
821 See Yankee, 526 N.E.2d at 1251; MacNeil v. Town of Avon, 435 N.E.2d 1043, 1046 (Mass. 
1982); Lovequist v. Conservation Comm'n of Town of Dennis, 393 N .E.2d 858, 866 (Mass. 1979); 
S. Kemble Fischer Realty Trust v. Board of Appeals of Concord, 402 N.E.2d 100, 103 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1980); Thrner v. Town of Walpole, 409 N.E.2d 807, 808 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). 
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anxious to find total deprivations even under that seemingly strict 
standard. This trend has not changed since Lucas.322 Lopes confirmed 
that, in those cases where regulations do not deny landowners all 
economically beneficial use, courts should apply pre-Lucas takings 
principles.323 Given the rarity of total deprivations, therefore, Massa-
chusetts courts will in the vast majority of cases continue to apply 
Penn Central's "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" to determine the 
validity of land use regulations and related regulatory takings 
claims.324 
C. Massachusetts Gives Some Content to "Residual Use" 
In Lucas, Justice Scalia assumed but did not hold that Lucas' land 
was deprived of all economically beneficial use.325 The question is 
therefore still open for states as to what residual uses may be suf-
ficient to render an alleged ''total deprivation" less than total. Since 
Jenckes, Massachusetts courts have paid close attention to the con-
tent of residual use in reviewing takings claims.326 In Jenckes, Justice 
Wilkins posited that a regulation, in order to avoid a taking, must 
leave a property with some "practical value."327 He considered that a 
zoning regulation that deprives property of any use, including "ordi-
nary agricultural" use, will leave the owner with only the ability to 
"look at it and pay taxes on it.''S28 Specifically, Justice Wilkins sug-
gested that the potential for playgrounds, parks, or accessory uses to 
adjacent parcels were not "practical" enough to uphold the enforce-
ment of a challenged by-Iaw.329 
After Jenckes, the court's attention to certain practical uses became 
a necessary component of its takings analysis, even in the face of 
otherwise legitimate exercises of the police power.330 In Volpe, the 
822 See Daddario v. Cape Cod Comm'n, 681 N .E.2d 833, 837 (Mass. 1997); Leonard v. Town of 
Brimfield, 666 N.E.2d 1300, 1304 (Mass. 1996); Greenfield County Estates Tenants Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Deep, 666 N.E.2d 988, 994 (Mass. 1996); Steinbergh v. City of Cambridge, 604 N.E.2d 1269, 1273 
(Mass. 1992); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 597 N.E.2d 43, 46 (Mass. 1992); Municipal Light Co. of 
Ashburnham v. Commonwealth, 608 N.E.2d 743, 748-49 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). 
323 See Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312, 1315 (Mass. 1994). 
324 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); DarUlario, 681 
N.E.2d at 837; Lopes 629 N.E.2d at 1315. 
326 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1020 n.9 (1992). 
326 See Jenckes v. Building Comm'rs of Brookline, 167 N.E.2d 757, 759 (Mass. 1960). 
327 See id. 
32B See id. 
329 See id. 
aao See Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 206 N .E.2d 666, 671 (Mass. 1965); 
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Supreme Judicial Court considered an examination of "practical uses" 
so critical to its takings analysis that it remanded the case for a 
determination, in part, of "[t]he uses which [could have been] made of 
the locus in its natural state."331 In so ruling, the Volpe court held that: 
"A crucial issue is whether, notwithstanding the meritorious charac-
ter of the regulation, there has been such a deprivation of the practical 
uses of a landowner's property as to be the equivalent of a taking 
without compensation."332 
Like in Volpe, the MacGibbon court also considered the lack of 
residual practical uses a crucial factor in determining the validity of 
zoning regulations.333 There the Supreme Judicial Court gave hints as 
to what residual uses might not be "practical" enough to avoid a 
takings claim.3M According to MacGibbon, recreational uses that are 
merely incidental to the enjoyment of land in its undeveloped state 
will not comply with the "applicable standard" of "practical" use.335 
After Mac Gibbon, Massachusetts regulators may therefore have dif-
ficulty asserting that such psychological notions as "pride of owner-
ship" and simple enjoyment of waterfront views-uses that are mere-
ly incidental to enjoying land in its natural state-are sufficient 
residual uses to indicate less than full deprivation.336 The notion that 
regulators may not, without compensating the landowner, utilize zon-
ing laws for the sole purpose of conservation has in fact been consid-
ered an underlying motive for the Lucas decision.337 
Turnpike Realty illustrates one scenario where the uses considered 
impractical by the MacGibbon court may nonetheless suffice to repel 
an attack on a land use regulation in Massachusetts, at least where 
see also MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 340 N.E.2d 487, 491 (Mass. 1976) (MacGib-
bon III); MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 255 N.E.2d 347, 352 (Mass. 1970) (MacGib-
bon m. 
331 See Volpe, 206 N.E.2d at 671. 
332 See id. at 669 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-94 (1962); Mile Rd. 
Corp. v. City of Boston, 187 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Mass. 1963». 
333 See MacGibbon III, 340 N.E.2d at 490. 
334 See id. at 491; MacGibbon II, 255 N.E.2d at 352. 
335 See MacGibbon III, 340 N.E.2d at 91; MacGibbon II, 255 N.E.2d at 351; see also Aronson 
v. Town of Sharon, 195 N.E.2d 341, 345 (Mass. 1964) (holding that such purposes are not 
authorized under the Massachusetts Zoning Enabling Act). 
336 See MacGibbon III, 340 N.E.2d at 491. 
337 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992) ("[R]egulations that 
leave the owner without economically beneficial or productive options for its use-typically, as 
here, by requiring land to be left substantially in its natural state-carry with them a height-
ened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise 
of mitigating serious public harm") (emphasis supplied); Sax, supra note 304, at 1440-41. 
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the risk of inland flooding is involved.338 In that case, the Supreme 
Judicial Court considered the potential for any "woodland, grassland, 
wetland, agricultural, horticultural or recreational use of land not 
requiring filling" as sufficient enough to uphold the validity of a bylaw 
in the face of an otherwise substantial restriction in the use of land.339 
However, that Turnpike Realty considered these uses significant 
enough to deny the plaintiff's claim was not the main thrust of its 
decision. Rather, the court relied primarily on the Mugler rule by 
intimating that regulations preventing a serious public harm are im-
mune from invalidation regardless of substantial devaluations in prop-
erty values: "Although it is clear that the petitioner is substantially 
restricted in its [sic] use of the land, such restrictions must be bal-
anced against the potential harm to the community from overdevelop-
ment of a flood plain area."340 In so reasoning, the Turnpike Realty 
court noted that "[a]lthough there was a substantial diminution in the 
value of the locus, the mere decrease in the value of a particular piece 
of land is not conclusive evidence of an unconstitutional deprivation 
of property."341 
D. Turnpike Realty: Limited Significance After Lucas, Lopes, and 
Florida Rock? 
Although Turnpike Realty seems to conflict with Mac Gibbon in its 
somewhat generous approach to residual uses, its holding is not nec-
essarily inconsistent with MacGibbon, Volpe, and even Lucas and 
Lopes.342 First, the landowner in Turnpike Realty did not plead a 
takings case, but posed an as applied challenge to the validity of 
the bylaw amendment.343 The issue of whether a taking had occurred 
338 See Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 899-90 (Mass. 1972). 
3a9 See id. at 900-01. The regulation diminished the value of the plaintiff's land from $431,000 
to $53,000. See id. at 900. 
340 See id. 
341 See id. Although the Turnpike Realty court cited Hadacheck in concluding that "although 
a comparison of values before and after is relevant ... it is by no means conclusive," it chose 
not to reference Justice Holmes' conclusion in Pennsylvania Coal that, "while property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if the regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 
See Turnpike Realty, 284 N.E.2d at 900; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 
(1922). 
342 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Lopes v. City of Peabody, 
629 N.E.2d 1312 (Mass. 1994); MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 340 N.E.2d 487 (Mass. 
1976) (MacGibbon 1Il); Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 206 N.E.2d 666 
(Mass. 1965). 
343 See Turnpike Realty, 284 N.E.2d at 894. 
478 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:431 
was not yet ripe for review, as, unlike in Volpe and MacGibbon, the 
Turnpike Realty plaintiff had not yet been denied any permits to build 
under the ordinance.344 Second, unlike in MacGibbon, Volpe, and 
Lopes, where the plaintiffs' properties arguably suffered more severe 
devaluations, the plaintiff's property in Turnpike Realty held a value 
of $53,000 even after the enactment of the ordinance.346 Third, the 
flood zoning by-law in Turnpike Realty might have conformed with 
Massachusetts' common-law nuisance principles according to Lucas, 
as "[t]he general necessity of flood plain zoning to reduce the damage 
to life and property caused by flooding" was considered "unquestion-
able" by the Turnpike Realty court.346 Indeed, for all its ambiguities 
concerning the content of the "nuisance exception," even Lucas ex-
plicitly suggested that the denial of a ''requisite permit to engage in 
a landfilling operation that would have the effect of flooding the oth-
ers' land" prohibits a use that is "always unlawful."347 As such, under 
Lucas, flood plain restrictions in Massachusetts may be examples of 
noncompensable government action, even in the face of complete 
deprivation of value.348 Therefore, Turnpike Realty may still be viable 
even under Lucas due to Justice Scalia's ambiguous conception of the 
nuisance exception.349 
Moreover, even if Turnpike Realty implies a tendency on the part 
of the Supreme Judicial Court to thwart takings challenges by recog-
nizing a generously broad conception of practical residual use, the fact 
that Turnpike Realty's holding has been invoked primarily in cases of 
flood plain regulation challenges may illustrate its particularly narrow 
scope.360 Indeed, the MacGibbon court even managed to distinguish 
344 See id. at 901 (Tauro, C.J., concurring). In fact, Chief Justice Tauro stressed in his concur-
rence that although the court was unable to conclude that the plaintiff suffered sufficient 
diminution in value to render the by-law unconstitutional, the court should have emphasized 
that it did not rule whether the plaintiff was an uncompensated victim of a taking. See id. at 
902 (Tauro, C.J., concurring). Such a ruling would have to depend on the Board's denial of a 
special permit. See id. 
845 See id. at 900. 
846 See 'Purnpike Realty, 284 N .E.2d at 899. 
847 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029, 1030 (1992) (emphasis in 
the original). 
848 See id. at 1029-30. 
849 See id. at 1025; see also Lazarus, supra note 304, at 1418-19. 
850 See Thmer v. Town of Walpole, 409 N.E.2d 807, 808-09 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980); S. Kemble 
Fischer Realty Trust v. Board of Appeals of Concord, 402 N .E.2d 100, 103 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). 
Indeed, even in Lopes, where the Supreme Court reviewed the validity of floodplain regulations, 
'Purnpike Realty was merely part of a string cite for its potential value in determining the 
restrictions imposed on the use of land subject to periodic flooding by ''nuisance and the law of 
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Turnpike Realty when considering the validity of the wetlands regu-
lations that prohibited MacGibbon's filling project.351 In so doing, the 
MacGibbon court simply dismissed Turnpike Realty on the grounds 
that "obstruction of a coastal tidewater at or above mean high water 
is very different from obstruction of a river."352 
The Land Court's invocation in Lopes of the Florida Rock "partial 
takings" analysis may also signal Turnpike Realty's diminished sig-
nificance in Massachusetts as an anti-takings case.353 By invoking 
Florida Rock, the Land Court in Lopes may have set the stage for 
the development of partial takings jurisprudence in Massachusetts, 
and in so doing may have clarified for Massachusetts what Justice 
Stevens recognized as a glaring ambiguity of the Lucas decision.354 In 
Florida Rock, the court considered regulatory takings to be possible 
not only in the absence of complete deprivation, but in cases of partial 
deprivation as well.355 In so reasoning, it held that whether a regula-
tion amounts to a partial taking depends on a balance of competing 
private and governmental interests.356 The Land Court in Lopes ap-
plied this principle on remand to Lopes' lot, which had limited residual 
uses under the ordinance similar to those allowed by the Turnpike 
Realty by-law: conservation of water, plants and wildlife, recreation, 
grazing, farming, forestry and nurseries.357 However, although Lopes' 
land was not fully devalued by the Peabody ordinance, the Land 
Court nevertheless rendered the ordinance inapplicable to Lopes' 
regulated parce1.358 For this reason, even in cases where the uses 
recognized by Turnpike Realty may actually exist, courts may none-
riparian rights." See Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312, 1317 (Mass. 1992). Moreover, 
on remand back to the Land Court, Turnpike Realty was not even cited. See generally Lopes 
v. City of Peabody, 3 Ld.Ct.Rptr. 78 (1995). 
351 See MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 340 N.E.2d 487, 491 (Mass. 1976) (MacGib-
bon Ill). 
302 See id. at 492. 
353 See Lopes, 3 Ld.Ct.Rptr. at 80 (citing Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 
1560, 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
354 See Ausness, supra note 7, at 397. Justice Scalia acknowledged but avoided the partial 
takings issue in Lucas. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 
(1992). 
355 See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1571. 
3Ii6 See id. 
357 See Lopes, 3 Ld.Ct.Rptr. at 79, 80. 
358 See id. at 80, 81. Judge Cauchon found that Lopes' land had "been deprived of most, if not 
all economically beneficial use." See id. Without the restrictions, the lot was worth $70,000. See 
id. at 80. After the restrictions, the parcel's market value ranged from $2,000-3,000. See id. 
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theless invoke the partial takings principle to either invalidate restric-
tive land use regulations, or to find partial takings. 
E. The "Denominator" Issue in Massachusetts 
Justice Scalia arguably reawakened in Lucas the question of whe-
ther a claimant's entire parcel or a burdened portion thereof should 
function as the denominator in the devaluation analysis of a takings 
claim.359 Before Lucas and Loveladies, this issue was considered set-
tled by the Penn Central and Keystone decisions, which considered 
the value of the entire parcel as relevant to the takings analysis.360 In 
Lucas, however, Justice Scalia implied without deciding that such a 
calculation was "extreme" and "unsupportable."361 Rather, he offered 
that the answer to the denominator issue "may lie in how the owner's 
reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of prop-
erty .... "362 Similarly, the Loveladies court later found that the bur-
dened portion of the claimant's land in that case could function as the 
denominator in the diminution analysis.363 However, Massachusetts 
courts have, both before and after Lucas, consistently viewed whole 
property interests as relevant to the takings devaluation analysis, and 
thus have ample precedent to sustain challenges based on Justice 
Scalia's footnoted criticism of Penn Central's rule.364 
This interpretation might in the future be reshaped by a successful 
application of Article 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 
which states that "no part of the property of any individual can, with 
justice, be taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his 
consent, or that of the representative body of the people .... "365 The 
359 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 n.7 (1992); Sugameli, supra 
note 110, at 478; Ausness, supra note 7, at 410. 
300 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 471 (1987); Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978); Sugameli, supra note 110, at 478. 
361 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 n.7. For a discussion of the possible repercussions of Justice 
Scalia's suggestion, see Fisher, supra note 126, at 1402-05. 
362 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 n.7. 
363 See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1180-82 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
364 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n. 7 (1992); Daddario v. 
Cape Cod Comm'n, 681 N.E.2d 833, 837 (Mass. 1997); Fragopoulos v. Rent Control Bd. of 
Cambridge, 557 N.E.2d 1153, 1157 (Mass. 1990); Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 526 N.E.2d 1246, 1250 n.8 (Mass. 1988); Moskow v. Commissioner of Dep't of 
Envtl. Management, 427 N .E.2d 750, 753 (Mass. 1981); Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 418 N.E.2d 
335,339 (Mass. 1981). For a post-Lucas Federal takings case which has sustained Penn Central's 
rule, see Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 802 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
365 See MASS. CONST. Art. X (emphasis supplied); Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312, 
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potential impact of the Massachusetts constitution to the takings 
issue is as of yet undetermined, although some Massachusetts practi-
tioners hope that Article lO's application to takings law will encourage 
courts to be more cautious in enforcing land-use laws.3OO Indeed, the 
Supreme Judicial Court has recently appeared to invite plaintiffs to 
argue that Article 10's language provides even more protection than 
the Fifth Amendment in takings challenges.367 No such claim has yet 
been successfully advanced, and future courts will need to decide in 
what way the Massachusetts Takings Clause will impact the current 
interpretation of partial takings claims. 
F. Nuisance Law in Massachusetts: Lucas as an Anti-Takings 
Tool? 
The nuisance exception to the Takings Clause has been a persistent 
feature of Massachusetts regulatory takings law.368 According to Lu-
cas, the nuisance exception will essentially thwart a landowner's claim 
of complete deprivation in cases where states regulate to "forestall 
grave threats to the lives and property of others."369 Lucas suggested 
that, in reviewing "total taking[s]" claims, courts should consider "the 
degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent private 
property posed by the claimant's activities ... " to help determine 
whether the prevention of public harm outweighs a landowner's enti-
tlement to compensation.370 
The Massachusetts courts are not unfamiliar with the nuisance 
exception as a tool for upholding restrictive land use regulations and 
denying takings claims.371 As early as in 1851, the Alger court upheld 
1313 n.2 (Mass. 1994); see also Steinbergh v. City of Cambridge, 604 N.E.2d 1269, 1272 (Mass. 
1992); Yankee, 526 N.E.2d at 1253 n.2 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
366 See Henriette Campagne, Interview with Nicholas J. Decoulos, 23 M.L.W. 2534 (Aug. 28, 
1995). 
367 See Yankee, 526 N.E.2d at 1253 n.2 (Lynch, J., dissenting); see also Daddario, 681 N.E.2d 
at 836 n.3 (court noted that plaintiff had not argued that Massachusetts Constitution provided 
greater protections than the United States Constitution); Steinbergh, 604 N.E.2d at 1272 ("Al-
though a similarity in standards under the 'takings' clauses of the two constitutions has not been 
as clearly established, the plaintiffs have advanced no reason why we should create takings 
principles more favorable to them than those developed under the Federal Constitution."). 
368 See Nassrv. Commonwealth,477 N.E.2d 987, 990 (Mass. 1985); Thrnpike Realty Co. v. Town 
of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 899-90 (Mass. 1972); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 54 (1851); 
see also Yankee, 526 N.E.2d at 1254. 
369 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 n.16 (1992). 
370 See id. at 1030-31. 
371 See Nassr, 477 N.E.2d at 990; Turnpike Realty, 284 N.E.2d at 899-90; Alger, 61 Mass. at 
54; see also Yankee, 526 N.E.2d at 1254. 
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a coastline construction regulation by concluding that it prevented 
noxious uses of property: "Nor does the prohibition of such noxious 
use of property, a prohibition imposed because such use would be 
injurious to the public, although it may diminish the profits of the 
owner, make it an appropriation to a public use, so as to entitle the 
owner to compensation."372 In fact, besides noting that the statute 
specifically designated construction beyond an established boundary 
as a "public nuisance," the Alger court asserted that "all real estate 
inland or on the sea shore, derived immediately or remotely from the 
state is taken and held under the tacit understanding that the owner 
shall deal with it so as not to cause injury to others."373 Although the 
landowner's property title in Alger was conveyed by a king's grant 
that vested "the right of soil" to the recipient, the court reasoned that 
nevertheless such a grant "will not justify the grantee in erecting such 
permanent structures thereon, as to disturb the common rights of 
navigation; and such obstruction ... is held to be a public or private 
nuisance, as the case may be."374 
The Nassr decision also provides an example where government 
regulation of nuisance-type activities will withstand a takings claim, 
even in the face of a temporary deprivation of all use of a landowner's 
property.375 In Nassr, the court denied the landowners' claim that the 
Commonwealth's action in seizing their property for eighteen months 
in order to remove hazardous waste amounted to a temporary tak-
ing.376 In so deciding, the court explicitly noted that the landowners 
had created a public nuisance by storing and disposing hazardous 
waste, and that the Commonwealth's decision to seize the property 
was a "classic exercise of the State's police power to maintain the 
public health."377 Although the landowners' profits were completely 
destroyed for over a year's period, the Nassr court held that the 
Commonwealth's actions to prevent nuisances "hardly transform[ed] 
this exercise of the police power into an exercise of eminent do-
main."378 
372 See Alger, 61 Mass. at 86. 
373 See id. at 86-90. 
374 See id. at 90. 
375 See Nassr, 477 N.E.2d at 990-91. 
376 See id. at 990. 
377 See id. The Nassr court cited Penn Centml in focusing on "the character of the action and 
on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole." See id. at 990 
(quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 194, 130-31 (1978». 
378 See id. at 991. The court further noted that the lower court had declared the plaintiff's 
activities a public nuisance. See Nassr, 477 N.E.2d at 991. 
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Similarly, the Yankee dissent also applied a Lucas-type "nuisance 
exception" analysis in examining the purpose of the petition that 
threatened to destroy Yankee Atomic's property interests in its nu-
clear plant.379 The Yankee dissent argued that the requisite question 
in the takings analysis was whether the regulation sought to abate a 
nuisance, or, alternatively, was it merely promoting the state's notions 
of economic efficiency.380 Drawing distinctions between Pennsylvania 
Coal and Keystone, the Yankee dissent considered it crucial to the 
takings analysis, especially in cases of total deprivation, whether the 
state's petition was grounded in background nuisance principles.ss1 
Finding that the petition's purpose of discontinuing an "unwise" eco-
nomic choice was not within the nuisance exception, the Yankee dis-
sent essentially foreshadowed Justice Scalia's later pronouncement in 
Lucas that regulators must find existing nuisance principles to sup-
port regulations that deny all beneficial use of land.382 
Massachusetts courts are therefore not new to "nuisance excep-
tion" applications to regulatory takings allegations. However, after 
Lucas, the lengths to which states must go to prove background 
nuisance principles are unclear. Indeed, Justice Scalia cautioned in 
Lucas that, in order to defend against total takings challenges, states 
"must do more than to proffer the legislature's declaration that the 
uses [a plaintiff] desires are inconsistent with the public interest, or 
the conclusory assertion that they violate a common law maxim such 
as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas."383 The Lopes court understood 
this suggestion to mean that "[a]fter the Lucas opinion, generally 
expressed political judgments concerning the desirability of a zoning 
regulation will do little to resolve the question whether a regulation 
substantially advances state interests.''384 Lucas may have, at the very 
least, increased a state's burden for a successful application of the 
nuisance exception. 
In Massachusetts, Lucas' seemingly more stringent "nuisance ex-
ception" may not necessarily undermine regulators' attempts to con-
379 See Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 526 N.E.2d 1246, 1254 
(Mass. 1988) (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
880 See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
381 See id. at 1252--54 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (citing generally Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n 
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922». 
382 See id; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
3&'1 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030. The Latin phrase denotes a common law maxim which 
translates as: "one should use his own property in such a manner as not to injure that of 
another." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990). 
8&1 See Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312, 1316 (Mass. 1994). 
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trol land use without the threat of takings claims, especially where 
coastland and inland flooding regulations are at issue. From Alger's 
pronouncement that coastal landowners cannot alter coastal lands to 
the detriment of the surrounding landscape, to Turnpike Realty's 
assertion that flood plain laws are necessary to reduce damage to life 
and property, Massachusetts' rich common law may contain the very 
background nuisance doctrines required by Lucas as a necessary 
element of the nuisance exception.385 Lucas essentially invites land 
use regulators to ground land use regulations in these principles as a 
defense against takings challenges. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Lucas arguably provides many more questions than it answers for 
land use regulators. However, Lucas should not have a significant 
impact on Massachusetts takings jurisprudence. Lopes made clear 
that in cases of less than complete deprivation, courts should continue 
to apply ad hoc, factual inquiries and pre-Lucas balancing tests. Based 
on the court's past reluctance to find total deprivation, Lucas and its 
categorical rule should therefore be applicable only in a limited num-
ber of instances. In cases where the court's "practical" use standard 
reveals complete deprivation, however, the introduction of Lucas' 
categorical rule will not present Massachusetts with a principle that 
is not already well-established in its own takings jurisprudence. More-
over, Massachusetts courts have often invoked nuisance principles to 
withstand takings challenges, even in cases of complete deprivation. 
If nuisance law drives land use regulation in Massachusetts, Lucas' 
seemingly pro-takings pronouncements should continue to have even 
less of an impact as a pro-takings tool. Rather, in the context of 
Massachusetts' common law nuisance principles, Lucas may in fact 
provide a useful avenue for land-use regulators to better shield them-
selves from regulatory takings liability. 
385 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; Thmpike Realty Co. v. 'Ibwn of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 899 
(1972); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 79, 84-86, 88, 96 (1851); see also Lummis v. Lilly, 
429 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Mass. 1982). 
